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Empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory attempts to explain individual cognitive variation in terms 
of an extrapolation of the autism spectrum. In this view, autism is an extreme version of the 
human brain in terms of its “male-ness,” the prototypical male brain being organized – via 
prenatal androgen exposure – for ‘systemizing,’ or detail-oriented, observation-based, ‘lawful, 
finite, and deterministic’ rule-making. The ‘extreme female brain,’ by contrast, is organized for 
‘empathizing,’ the ability to accurately attribute intentionality to others. The full range of these 
attributes constitutes the E-S spectrum, within which the general population is normally 
distributed. E-S theory helps explain individual and sex differences with real world importance, 
such as the social idiosyncrasies characterizing many individuals in systemizing fields (e.g., 
engineering, computer science) and the underrepresentation of women in STEM. Implicit in E-S 
theory is the assumption that empathizing and systemizing domains co-vary; that social tradeoffs 
come with a detail-oriented cognitive “style”. This assumption is recognizable in the 
longstanding search for singular causes of autism that will explain social and non-social 
symptoms; and in everyday presumptions about the social skills of individuals excelling in 
numerical and spatial domains. We begin with an overview of the E-S covariance literature and 
the three works comprising this dissertation, followed by individual chapters discussing each 
work in depth. The first is an empirical investigation indicating that E-S co-variance assumptions 
apply more to males than females, in whom the two domains are orthogonal. These sex-
 
dependent patterns extend to college major, suggesting an ability breadth alternative to the 
absolute ability account of female STEM underrepresentation. The second reviews cognitive sex 
differences studies utilizing second-to-fourth digit length ration (2D/4D) as a biomarker of 
prenatal testosterone exposure, and argues that the biological linchpin of E-S theory – the brain 
organization effects of prenatal testosterone exposure – may also be sex-dependent. The third 
synthesizes the literature on empathizing-systemizing co-variance across clinical, sub-clinical, 
and typically developing populations into a model of developmentally emergent E-S co-variance. 
In each case co-variance assumptions are confirmed and challenged, providing novel insights 
about typical and autistic development. In the concluding chapter this model is used to account 
for the findings of the first two works, and future empirical directions are suggested based on the 
collective insights of all three works.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 THE EMPATHIZING-SYSTEMIZING CO-VARIANCE HYPOTHESIS 
1.1 Introduction 
 The topical focus of this thesis is the hypothesis, hereafter referred to as the 
“Empathizing-Systemizing (E-S) Co-variance Hypothesis”, that individual differences in so-
called “systemizing” domains of ability – those favoring a detail-oriented cognitive “style” (e.g., 
spatial, numerical, and technical domains) – are inversely related to individual differences in the 
ability to make accurate social inferences about others’ intentions (“empathizing”, “Theory of 
Mind”, or “mindreading”). As the reader will see, the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis manifests in 
many forms in the empirical literature, from underlying causes of autism to neurobiological 
accounts of the underrepresentation of women in science, but for introductory purposes readers 
may find it helpful to conceptualize the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis in terms of a common lay 
psychological theory: that prowess in fields like mathematics and engineering comes hand-in-
hand with social ineptitude. 
The primary goal of the present thesis is to assess the veracity of the E-S Co-variance 
Hypothesis, through the presentation and cross-referenced discussion of three original, published 
works. At face, these three works appear unrelated, varying widely in specific focus, approach, 
and level of analysis; but each holds direct relevance to E-S Co-variance Hypothesis, and 
together they provide a cross-section of its many levels of prediction. Thus, in presenting and 
discussing these three tangentially related works, the reader will be provided with the multiple 
theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, sample populations, and levels of analysis 
needed to fully evaluate the veracity of the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis.  
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1.2 Work One: Sex and Field Differences in Empathizing-Systemizing Co-variance  
In the realm of normative cognitive variation, the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis takes the 
form of cognitive sex difference predictions, namely that males are more likely than females to 
exhibit the high systemizing/low empathizing extremity of the inverse E-S Co-variance 
relationship. This prediction has, in turn, been extrapolated into the realm of sex differences in 
field of study/occupational choices, and an account of female underrepresentation in STEM 
disciplines. 
Addressing this version of the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis is the first work presented 
below: an empirical investigation of sex and field of study differences in Empathizing, 
Systemizing, and Empathizing-Systemizing Co-variance, with a normative adult sample (Valla et 
al., 2010). In this correlational study, undergraduate students from a wide range of academic 
disciplines completed a variety of systemizing- and empathizing-related cognitive, social 
cognitive, and self-report personality measures. The main finding was that Empathizing-
Systemizing Co-variance is a sex-dependent phenomenon, more pronounced in males than in 
females. Moreover, these sex-dependent patterns extended to field of study; males in systemizing 
disciplines were equally notable for their social cognitive difficulties and detail-oriented 
cognitive ‘style’, whereas the detail-oriented cognitive style of females in these disciplines did 
not appear to come hand-in-hand with social cognitive difficulties.  
1.3 Work Two: Brain Organization Theory, Digit Ratio (2D/4D), and Sex Differences in 
Preferences and Cognition  
The underlying basis of the sex differences explored in the first work is thought to be 
hemispheric lateralization, induced by prenatal androgen exposure. Addressing this 
neurobiological level of the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis is the second work presented below, a 
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review and synthesis of one particular subset of the literature on prenatal hormonal influences on 
cognitive sex differences in systemizing and empathizing domains (Valla & Ceci, 2011): studies 
using 2nd-to-4th digit length ratio (2D:4D) as a proxy measure of prenatal androgen exposure. In 
this second work it is first argued that 2D:4D evidence generally supports the idea of cognitive 
sex differences, and prenatal androgen exposure as the biological impetus for these sex 
differences. It is then argued that the sex-dependent patterns of E-S Co-variance seen in the first 
work – greater E-S Co-variance in males than in females – may be the result of sex-dependent 
developmental trajectories that begin with prenatal hormone lateralization, resulting in 
downstream effects on preferences for and ability in empathizing and systemizing domains, 
starting in early development and increasing with age. This second work therefore extends 
support for E-S Co-variance to prenatal biological factors and early development, laying the 
groundwork for the developmental model of E-S Co-variance introduced in the third work. 
1.4 Work Three: Co-variation of Social and Non-social ‘Autistic’ Traits, in Autistic and  
Typical Development: A Review and Developmental Synthesis 
The third work ties the concept of E-S Co-variance to the realm of autism and its sub-
clinical manifestations. Specifically, in the context of autism the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis 
manifests in the idea that autistic social difficulties and hyper-focused, systemizing-centric 
cognitive ‘style’ are related, such that individuals on the spectrum represent an extreme version 
of the high systemizing/low empathizing “male” pattern argued in the first two works. This 
hypothesis of autistic social/non-social trait co-variance, sometimes referred to as the “Kanner 
Hypothesis” in the autism literature, is in fact a longstanding debate in autism research, as the 
question of social/non-social trait co-variance ultimately comes down to whether there is a single 
underlying cause of autism.  
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The third work addresses this clinical version of the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis, and ties 
it to the realms of normative cognitive variation and its development discussed in the first two 
works. More specifically, this third work begins with a review of the evidence regarding the 
factor structure of autistic social and non-social traits, including those falling under the 
categories of empathizing and systemizing, in both clinical and typically developing populations. 
The gist of this review is that there is overall support for the E-S Co-variance Hypothesis, as well 
as some indication that E-S Co-variance 1) increases with extremity in empathizing and 
systemizing domains, such that males are more likely to exhibit co-variance than females, and 
autistic individuals are more likely to exhibit co-variance than typically developing individuals;  
and 2) increases with development, such that co-variance increases with age, especially in 
autistic and typically developing male populations. Based on this review, a developmental model 
is then proposed to account for these patterns of E-S co-variance in behavior, and tie them to 
neurobiological development.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SEX AND FIELD DIFFERENCES IN EMPATHIZING-SYSTEMIZING CO-VARIANCE  
2.1 Introduction  
Baron-Cohen’s “Extreme Male Brain” (EMB) and “Empathizing-Systemizing” (E/S) 
theories attempt to explain an entire range of individual cognitive and social variation, clinical 
and normative, in terms of an extrapolation of the autism spectrum. Characteristics said to vary 
along this continuum include deficits in understanding intentionality, or Theory of Mind (ToM); 
a bias toward local over global information processing, or weak central coherence (WCC); 
deficits in future-oriented cognitive flexibility; and restricted interests and repetitive behaviors 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Happé, 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991). In this view, 
autism (along with Asperger syndrome, Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified, and the sub-clinical idiosyncrasies of many autism family members, or the Broader 
Autism Phenotype; Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997a; Dawson et al., 2002; Happé et al., 2001; 
Lord, Cook, Leventhal, & Amaral, 2000; Piven, 1999) is an extreme version of the human brain 
in terms of its “male-ness,” the prototypical male brain being organised for superior 
“systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997b), or processes of 
observation-based rule-making that reduce the world to a series of “lawful, finite, and 
deterministic” rules. The “extreme female brain”, by contrast, is organized for “empathizing”, 
the ability to accurately attribute and affectively respond to others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen, 
2002). 
The full range of these attributes, from high to low empathizing and from high to low 
systemizing, constitutes the entire E/S spectrum, within which the general population is said to 
be distributed normally (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997b). One’s position on this continuum is 
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thought to be determined partly by levels of testosterone exposure during gestation (Baron-
Cohen, Lutchmaya, & Knickmeyer, 2004). Most recently, Chakrabarti et al. (2009) have found 
support for this connection, linking sex steroid genes to autistic traits, and to empathizing, as 
measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and Empathizing Quotient, respectively; the 
former is a self-report survey used for measuring sub-clinical levels of autistic traits, the latter a 
self-report survey of empathic tendencies. 
Still unclear is whether empathizing and systemizing are independent or dependent 
abilities or, in other words, whether the E/S factor space is single- or multi-axis in nature (Carroll 
& Chiew, 2006). More than a trivial distinction, if the E/S factor space is a single axis along 
which all individuals are distributed, as it was initially described (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 
1997b), then systemizing ability should carry with it tradeoffs in empathizing, and vice versa. 
An alternative model, explicitly (and somewhat paradoxically) depicted by Baron-Cohen 
in his EMB synthesis and subsequent work (Baron-Cohen, 2002), describes the E/S spectrum as 
a two-factor space where empathizing and systemizing vary independently, an extreme male 
brain arising from concurrently low empathizing and high systemizing abilities, an extreme 
female brain arising from the opposite pattern. The major implication is that there would be no 
tradeoffs between systemizing and empathizing.  If empathizing and systemizing are 
independent, reason Carroll and Chiew, then so too are ToM (an empathizing ability) and WCC 
(a systemizing ability). If such were the case, then E/S theory would have to be reframed, as the 
posited covariance of empathizing and systemizing is what has allowed E/S theory to explain 
social and non-social cognitive variations simultaneously. A lack of covariance would also be a 
blow to theories attempting to account for autism spectrum conditions (ASC) with a single-cause 
explanation, and the broader idea of ASC's arising from coincidence of independent factors, both 
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distal (genetics), and proximal (cognitive manifestations) (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006), 
might begin to seem more likely. 
2.1.1 Empathizing and Systemizing in the Normative Population 
Exploring cognitive covariance in the general population allows us to test the predictions 
of E/S theory and, indirectly, to test whether there may be a central factor underlying autism. In a 
sense, testing the general population makes a more sound strategy than testing the ASC 
population would do: exploring covariance within ASC would, by clinical definition, mean 
testing a population in which the traits in question co-exist within each individual; thus if there is 
a disjunction between empathizing and systemizing, assessing the general population offers the 
best chance of discovering it (Happé et al., 2006). To date, evidence of covariance and sex 
differences from normative populations has been mixed. 
Jarrold et al. (2000) found a negative correlation between ToM (tested via the “Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes” test, or RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Raste, Hill, & Plumb, 2001a) 
and WCC (tested via the Embedded Figures Test, or EFT) overall, as predicted by a single-axis 
E/S spectrum. In their sample of 30 individuals of each sex, the relationship reached statistical 
significance in women but not in men, suggesting a partially sex-dependent ToM-WCC 
covariance pattern. None of the EMB model's predicted sex differences in RMET and EFT 
scores were found. This combination of results supported the single-axis E/S model, but not 
EMB theory. 
Carroll and Chiew (2006), in contrast, found no relationship between the RMET and 
either of two WCC measures (the EFT and a Block Design test), between systemizing ability and 
the RMET, or between the EQ and Systemizing Quotient (SQ), supporting a dual-axis E/S 
spectrum for both sexes. Also in contrast with Jarrold et al., they found sex differences on all 
  8 
measures except for the EFT. Similarly supporting empathizing and systemizing independence 
and predicted sex differences, Walter, Dassonville, and Bochler (2008) found that resistance to 
visual contextual illusions (an aspect of WCC) correlated with SQ scores, while SQ and EQ 
scores were independent of each other but related to sex in the predicted direction.  
Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, and Boomsma (2008) factor analyzed the five subcategories of 
autistic symptoms comprising the AQ (Attention Switching, Communication, Imagination, 
Social Skills, detail/pattern orientation), and identified two underlying factors, broadly termed 
Social Interaction (encompassing the first four subcategories) and Details/Patterns, using both 
normative and clinical populations. Although this result supports the dual-axis E/S model, the 
questions from the Social Interaction subcategories do overlap with each other much more than 
with the details/patterns questions; attention switching, for instance, is partly posed in the context 
of keeping track of multiple conversations simultaneously, whereas orientation to detail is never 
posed in a social context. The apparent two-factor symptom structure thus may be an artifact of 
the AQ’s having been designed with an empathizing- systemizing dichotomy implicitly in mind.  
Voracek and Dressler (2006) found no correlations between the SQ, EQ, and RMET in 
females, whereas males manifested correlations opposite to those predicted, positive between the 
RMET and SQ and between the EQ and SQ, supporting a sex-dependent E/S factor space and 
suggesting that males may solve empathizing problems by applying systemizing skills—a point 
to which we shall return. Thus, evidence exists for three versions of the E/S factor space: (1) 
dependence between empathizing and systemizing, (2) independence between these abilities, and 
(3) both of these covariance patterns, the former in males, the latter in females.  
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2.1.2 Empathizing, Systemizing, and Field of Study 
Separate from sex difference and covariance predictions are predicted field-of-study 
differences, specifically the hypothesis that populations in mathematically intensive fields 
(mathematics, engineering, computer science, physical sciences) will exhibit ‘‘extreme male 
brain’’ characteristics, while populations in biological sciences  
and medicine will exhibit ‘‘male brain’’ characteristics to a lesser extent than the more 
mathematically intensive fields, but more so than social sciences and humanities.  
Carroll and Chiew (2006) found predicted field differences on the RMET, Block Design 
test, and SQ, but no differences on the AQ or EQ, partially supporting predictions of E/S theory. 
Contrary to expectations, a sex-by-field interaction arose for the EQ wherein male humanities 
students scored significantly lower than male science students, female science students, and 
female humanities students, the latter three being no different from one another. Austin (2005), 
in contrast, did find the predicted difference in AQ scores between students in mathematical and 
physical sciences, and those in all other fields, while Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, and Clubley, (2001b) found that among systemizing fields, mathematicians scored higher 
on the AQ than engineers, physicists, and computer scientists (who did not differ), and that 
individuals in these four fields scored significantly higher than individuals in medical and 
biological sciences (who did not differ). Moreover, individuals from these six fields scored 
higher than individuals from social sciences and humanities. Thus, degrees of E/S difference 
may exist even between fields traditionally grouped under the systemizing label.  
2.1.3 Digit Ratio 
An increasingly popular method for measuring prenatal testosterone exposure, if 
indirectly, is measuring individuals’ second-to-fourth digit length ratio (2D:4D). Since the 
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former digit’s length is correlated with prenatal oestrogen level, and the latter with prenatal 
testosterone level, the 2D:4D ratio hypothetically indicates relative levels of prenatal testosterone 
and oestrogen exposures in utero (Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen, Raggatt, Knickmeyer, & Manning, 
2004), a lower 2D:4D being more masculine. Manning, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Sanders 
(2001) found support for EMB in a digit ratio study in which individuals with ASC, and their 
immediate family members, had lower 2D:4D than normal controls. The effect of prenatal 
testosterone on systemizing skills may also be sex dependent (Falter, Arroyo, & Davis, 2006; 
Kempel et al., 2005). Evidence indicates a quadratic, inverted-U relationship between 2D:4D and 
systemizing in males, with the optimal 2D:4D for systemizing being in the high (feminine) male 
range, and an inverse relationship in females (Falter et al., 2006; Kempel et al., 2005; Romano, 
Leoni, & Saino, 2006), implying that EMB predictions of prenatal testosterone exposure might 
apply only to females. Voracek and Dressler (2006), however, found no relationships between 
2D:4D and the RMET, EQ, or SQ in either sex.  
2.2 Current Study 
Though the structural nature and veracity of group difference predictions of E/S theory 
are unclear, what is clear is that questions of covariance, and sex and field differences among 
ASC-related attributes in the general population remain open. Covariance is most completely 
assayed by (1) taking data from the same participants on a wide array of ASC-relevant skills and 
attributes (RMET, EFT, 2D:4D, etc.), rather than relying on parallels between studies that only 
partially overlap methodologically; (2) using both standard and novel measures, so that evidence 
does not rest solely on the most frequently-used measures (EFT and RMET, e.g.); and (3) testing 
for differences in empathizing and systemizing between social sciences and humanities, and 
between humanities and fine arts – comparisons that, thus far incompletely explored, may 
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challenge the assumption that the high-empathizing end of the E/S factor space (high 
empathizing with separate but concurrent low systemizing in the dual-axis version; high 
empathizing with correlated low systemizing in the single-axis version) does not exhibit fine-
grained differences akin to those observed between systemizing fields. Intuitively, this fine-
grained subdivision seems possible, as social science involves constructing predictable systems 
to explain behaviors that are initially “observed” through empathic conjectures, whereas 
humanities and fine arts are more heavily conceptual and emotive than systematic. 
 These goals and new questions are addressed by assaying covariance among, and sex and 
field differences in, the RMET, EFT, AQ, and 2D:4D using a single adult participant pool. These 
frequently used measures are complemented with the Benton Face Recognition Test (Benton, 
Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983), face recognition being an area of autistic deficit not yet 
explored in the context of normal cognitive variation and E/S theory. Two further novel 
measures are presented in the motivating and ecologically valid context of a video game: The 
first of these is psychophysical threshold for perception of dot motion coherence, a measure of 
WCC; performance on this measure is a function of integrative or global processing, rather than 
a function of lack of global processing as in the cases of the EFT and Block Design test. The 
second measure is go/no-go motor inhibition, an aspect of executive functioning and ASC deficit 
not typically examined in relation to the aforementioned measures in normative populations. 
On the theory of inversely related empathizing and systemizing, the dual-axis model of 
E/S factor space notwithstanding, we hypothesized positive correlations between RMET 
accuracy, EFT response latency, Benton accuracy, go/no-go response speed, and 2D:4D, and 
negative correlations between these measures and the motion coherence threshold.  Assuming 
replication of Hoekstra et al.’s two-component (Social Interaction, Details) model of AQ 
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subdomain scores, we expected AQ Social Interaction composite scores to be negatively 
correlated with RMET accuracy, EFT latency, Benton accuracy, go/no-go response speed, and 
2D:4D, and positively correlated with motion coherence threshold; we expected AQ Details 
composite scores to exhibit the inverse pattern. 
We expected women to outperform men on the RMET, Benton, go/no-go, and motion 
coherence measures, and to have higher 2D:4D than men, and we expected men to outperform 
women on the EFT, and to have higher AQ scores.  Field-of-study differences were hypothesized 
to follow a spectrum embedded within the E/S factor space, from fine arts and humanities at the 
high-empathizing-low-systemizing edge of the space to social sciences, to biological and medical 
sciences, to physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering at the high-systemizing/low-
empathizing edge. 
2.3 Methods 
 144 university students (65 men, 79 women; M = 20.2y, SD = 1.86y) were recruited from 
undergraduate classes. Participants were pre-screened, excluding personal history of 
neurological, sensory, and/or endocrine disorders, pregnancy, transgender identity, and personal 
or family history of mood disorder, schizophrenia, attention deficit disorder, or ASC. The study 
protocol was approved by the Cornell University Institutional Review Board.  Participants 
completed a demographic survey (sex, date of birth, field of study). Fields of study were coded 
on a 5-point scale with fine arts (visual arts, theatre, dance, film, &c.) as 1, humanities (literature, 
linguistics, history, religion, philosophy, &c.) as 2, social sciences (economics, sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, political science, &c.) as 3, biological sciences and medicine as 4, 
and physical sciences (physics, chemistry, geology, &c.) and other mathematically-intensive 
fields (computer science, mathematics, systems science, &c.) as 5. 
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 Participants completed the AQ, RMET, a computer-based EFT (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, 
& Karp, 1971), the Benton, and tests of motion coherence and go/no-go motor inhibition 
embedded in a video game. To measure motion coherence, participants viewed a field of 200 
randomly distributed white dots (“stars”), against a black background, on a 332mm x 210mm 
display. During each trial (3 blocks, 140 trials/block), either a certain percentage of “stars” 
would move coherently (signal) to the left or right (randomly chosen for each trial) at 16°/s while 
the remaining “stars” (noise) would move in random directions, or no coherent motion would be 
present. Each dot remained for exactly four 60 Hz video frames. Participants were instructed to 
press a right or left arrow key corresponding to the direction of perceived motion, and visual 
feedback was given to indicate performance accuracy.  Responses were accepted until 0.5s after 
the end of the trial. Trials ended when a response was issued, or after 2s plus a random and 
uniformly distributed interval between 0 and 250ms. Motion coherence threshold was computed 
via maximum-likelihood parameter estimation by sequential testing (PEST; Pentland, 1980). 
 For the motor inhibition measure, at random intervals during the game the player was 
offered the chance to open a “wormhole” through which a friend or a foe, distinguished by 
shape, would appear.  Targets were presented after the participant signaled readiness by pressing 
a key to open the wormhole.  The participant was to “shoot” (via a key press) foes but not 
friends. Reaction times were measured up to a maximum of 800 ms following the emergence of 
a foe. 
 The AQ was scored similarly to Austin's (2005) four-point Likert scale (1-4) rather than 
Baron-Cohen’s 0/1 scoring, except instead of a 1-4 scale a symmetric scale of -2, -1, +1, +2 was 
used. The five AQ subcategory scores, attention switching (AQAttSw), communication 
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(AQComm), details/patterns (AQDet), imagination (AQImag), and social skills (AQSS) were 
also recorded. 
Each participant’s right hand was scanned at a resolution of 300 dpi for 2D:4D 
measurement. The horizontal and vertical coordinates of the tip and of the midpoint of the basal 
crease of each participant’s index (2D) and ring (4D) fingers were noted in mm, finger lengths 
were calculated, and 2D:4D ratios were computed using these finger lengths. 
2.4 Results 
 Means and standard deviations for each measure, by sex and field of study, are 
summarized in Table 8. Outliers for each measure, defined as being greater than 3 times the 
interquartile range, were removed from the data; 1 outlier was removed from Benton scores, 1 
from digit ratios, and 3 from EFT latencies. AQ scores were unavailable for 6 participants who 
failed to complete all questions. Because of technological issues during ongoing software 
development for the video game, motion coherence data were available from only 64 
participants, and go/no-go data from only 128 participants. All measures were normally 
distributed according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests except for EFT latencies, 
which were normalized using a logarithmic transformation. 
2.4.1 AQ Subdomain Principal Components Analyses 
 AQ subdomain scores AQAttSw, AQComm, AQDet, AQImag, and AQSS from the 
entire sample were subjected to a principal components analysis (PCA); all components with 
eigenvalues greater than one were extracted (Kaiser method) (Table 2). In replication of 
Hoekstra et al., this analysis yielded two principal components: the first, accounting for 44% of 
the total variance in AQ subdomain scores, was consistent with Hoekstra et al.’s Social 
Interaction factor, loading on subdomains AQAtt, AQCom, AQSS, and AQImag; the second, 
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accounting for 20% of the variance, was consistent with Hoekstra et al.’s Details factor, 
comprised of the AQDet subdomain alone. Based on this PCA, Social Interaction (AQSI) and 
Details (AQDet) composite scores were calculated for each participant, to be correlated with 
behavioral measures. 
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2.4.2 Intercorrelations Between Empathizing- and Systemizing Traits, and Field of Study 
Correlation coefficients for the RMET, EFT, motion coherence threshold, reaction time, 
field of study, 2D:4D, and AQ full-scale and composite scores (AQSI and AQDet), by sex, are 
summarized in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Tail probabilities are two-sided, and were calculated 
after each variable was z-transformed. Correlations were not subjected to multiple comparison 
corrections because (a) each hypothesis was generated a priori, with each having an independent 
theoretical and empirical justification; (b) testing E/S theory by nature means testing for 
interrelatedness among many measures broadly grouped under empathizing and systemizing 
labels, so whilst a priori hypotheses involved individual correlations, evidence for and against 
E/S relationships was interpreted in terms of patterns, not through conclusions drawn solely from 
potentially anomalous individual effects.  Importantly, previous studies of the E/S spectrum in 
the literature have taken this same exact approach to multiple comparisons of correlated data 
(e.g., Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Voracek & Dressler, 2006; Walter, Dassonville, & Bochler, 2008) 
and, as such, direct comparisons to findings in the literature require such an approach. 
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In women, higher-systemizing fields were significantly related to the AQ Details 
composite score (AQDet), r(76) = 0.255, p = .026, as well as 2D:4D, r(78) = -0.230, p = .042; in 
men, these correlations were much lower or non-existent. Conversely, men’s fields of study were 
significantly related to higher Full-scale AQ scores, r(62) = .307, p = .015, AQSI composite 
scores, r(62) = 0.347, p = .006, lower RMET scores, r(65) = -0.291, p = .019, as well as lower 
Benton scores, though non-significantly, r(65) = -0.163, p = .19; each of these correlations were 
much lower or non-existent in women. Higher AQSI composite scores were also related to 
significantly lower Benton scores, r(62) = -0.347, p = .006, and RMET scores, r(62) = -0.385, p 
= .002, in men; in contrast, neither of these relationships were present in women. Motion 
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coherence threshold was related to lower AQDet subscores in men, though marginally non-
significantly (perhaps due to the small number of available motion coherence thresholds), r(27) = 
-0.310, p= .12, whereas in women this correlation was essentially zero. Prolonged go/no-go 
response time was related to higher AQSI subscores in men, though marginally non-
significantly, r(55) = -0.216, p = .11, whereas in women there was no association between 
reaction time and either AQ composite score. Amongst the cognitive measures, men’s, but not 
women’s, RMET and Benton scores were significantly, positively related, r(65) = 0.321, p = 
.009. 
2.4.3 Post-hoc AQ Subdomain Principal Components Analyses, Separately By Sex 
 Based on above correlations trending toward sex-dependent covariance structures in 
empathizing and systemizing traits, we repeated the AQ subdomain score PCA to see if there 
were a similar sex difference in factor loadings, with more overlap between social and non-social 
traits in men than in women. Factor loadings were essentially unchanged from the original PCA 
for women (Table 5); Attention Switching, Communication, Imagination, and Social Skills 
subdomains loaded on a Social Interaction component (accounting for 46% of the total variance), 
whilst the Details subdomain comprised the majority of the second component, which accounted 
for 20.7% of the total variance. By contrast, much more overlap between subdomains was 
evident in men (Table 6); while the first component was similar to the Social Interaction factor 
from the full sample PCA (accounting for 40.1% of the total variance), the second component 
(accounting for 21.3% of variance) included the Details subdomain, but also had positive 
Communication and Social Skills loadings. 
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2.4.4 Group Differences 
 A series of 2 (Sex) x 5 (Field of Study) analyses of variance was performed to test for 
main effects of Sex and Field, and Sex-by-Field interactions, for each dependent measure. A 
main effect of Field arose for AQ scores, F(4, 128)= 3.773, p = .006, and post hoc t-tests using 
Tukey’s method revealed a difference between high systemizing fields and both social sciences 
and humanities, both p = .016. Main effects for Sex arose for 2D:4D, F(1, 133)= 8.409, p = .004 
(with men’s digit ratios being lower on average than women’s, as expected), and motor 
inhibition, F(1, 119)= 7.76, p = .006, as men’s go/no-go reaction times were greater than 
women’s, on average. 
2.5 Discussion 
 In this sample of normal young adults, the relationship between empathizing and 
systemizing was highly sex-dependent. In men, empathizing and systemizing, or social and non-
social “autistic” traits, were inversely related, indicating a mainly unidimensional scale of male 
empathizing and systemizing abilities. In women, empathizing and systemizing were largely 
independent, implying a multi-dimensional factor structure of autistic traits. Notable exceptions 
to these generalizations existed for each sex, though. 
In men, being in a systemizing field of study was associated with “autistic” social 
difficulties measured by the four AQ subscales comprising the AQ Social Interaction (AQSI) 
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component (AQSS, AQComm, AQImag, AQAttSw) that was also related to decreased face 
recognition ability, and to decreased RMET scores; similarly, field was inversely related to these 
two face processing measures, with higher systemizing fields associating with lower Benton and 
RMET scores. At the same time, field was unrelated to traits typically associated with 
systemizing ability, such as motion coherence threshold, EFT latency, and the AQDet subscale. 
Thus, for men being in a systemizing field was related to poor empathizing and, at least within 
this study's set of measures, was more closely correlated with poor empathizing than with high 
systemizing. Similarly supporting an inverse E/S relationship in men, increased reaction time on 
the go/no-go measure of motor inhibition was directly related to the AQSI (though not 
significantly so), suggesting that inhibition of complex social behaviors may bear some relation 
to inhibition of simple motor behaviors; men in the current study, it follows, incurred reaction 
time costs of inhibiting the impulse to repetitively “shoot” at every ship emerging from a 
wormhole. 
In women, fewer significant associations between measures arose overall, both within 
and between empathizing and systemizing domains. The few associations that did arise were 
within the latter domain; being in a systemizing field was associated with elevated AQDet scores 
(a composite measure of the systemizing tendencies of detail-oriented cognition and pattern 
recognition) in women; systemizing fields in women were also related to masculine (lower) digit 
ratios. Also in contrast to men, women’s choice of field was not related to the social interaction 
AQ subscale, or to either face processing measure. In men, field was more closely related to 
(poor) empathizing than systemizing strengths. In addition, if digit ratio is indeed a reliable index 
of prenatal testosterone exposure, then the predictions of EMB (ironically) applied only to 
females – perhaps because of a ceiling effect in males' testosterone exposure.  Further supporting 
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female E/S independence, in women neither of the face processing measures was related to either 
of the WCC measures, motion coherence threshold and EFT latency. 
Women exhibited a covariance pattern opposite men’s in another sense; not only were 
women’s empathizing and systemizing abilities largely independent, but so were abilities 
typically grouped under the empathizing label. This was not the case in men, where empathizing 
abilities were related to systemizing and to other empathizing measures (Benton and RMET, 
e.g.), and it may mean that, in females, the E/S covariance structure may be multi-dimensional in 
a way that cannot be accounted for by any current E/S model. Social cognitive tasks such as face 
recognition, emotion/intention reading, and communication, for instance, may each employ a 
more domain-specific strategy in women than in men. 
On the male side of this argument are findings that indicate more extensive 
unidimensionality in men than can be accounted for in the single-axis E/S spectrum model. 
Contrary to expectations, but supporting this male E/S unidimensionality, men’s RMET and 
Benton scores – which were positively related – were both inversely related to EFT latency 
(though non-significantly), meaning that faster disembedding was associated with increased face 
processing abilities; similarly, men’s RMET scores were directly (but non-significantly) related 
to AQDet scores. Also contrary to expectations, in an exploratory analysis men’s motion 
coherence threshold seemed inversely related to AQDet subscores. Rather than indicating a 
positive relationship between empathizing and systemizing in men, as was argued by Voracek 
and Dressler (2006) when they found positive correlations between males’ EQ and SQ, and SQ 
and RMET scores, we believe our results make a case for the idea that males may apply 
systemizing skills, such as disembedding, to empathizing tasks such as face processing – by 
disembedding individual facial features relevant to face recognition and emotion/intention 
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reading. 
These data may help elucidate two important questions echoed by Jarrold et al. about the 
causal and functional natures of any empathizing-systemizing links, questions that have 
concerned ASC theorists for some time (Frith & Happé, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995, e.g.). Jarrold 
et al. entertain the possibility that the apparent ToM/WCC link may be illusory, arising from the 
use of RMET/EFT correlations to test this hypothesis. While the RMET is purported to measure 
intention-reading, they say, part of the skill required to “read” mental states from faces is gestalt, 
or centrally coherent, visual perception. Taking this argument a step further to infer causality, 
and citing “other data” as evidence, they state that WCC likely leads to ToM deficits, not vice 
versa, because “central coherence appears to be a lower level process than theory of mind”, and 
“it appears highly unlikely that something as ‘psychological’ as theory of mind…could explain 
low-level visual bias effects” (p. 135). As for the functional link between ToM and WCC, the 
authors defer to Frith’s (1989) conjecture that WCC makes integrating social information from 
numerous sources difficult, and raise the possibility that joint attention (the triangulation of 
attention between the self, an object, and the other, a ToM precursor) is the specific ToM skill 
affected by WCC. 
Our results support a methodologically-based link between systemizing and face 
processing, as Jarrold et al. posit, but just as the correlation between RMET and EFT scores in 
our males was in the opposite direction to that of Jarrold et al., our methodological reasoning is 
likewise opposite theirs. In contrast to their argument that the EFT and RMET are linked due to 
the central coherence needed to accurately read intention from faces, we argue that men who are 
quicker at disembedding geometric figures may also be better at disembedding relevant facial 
features on the RMET and, perhaps, the Benton.  In other words, these tests of empathizing, 
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when applied to the male population, may actually be measuring systemizing. 
Despite our opposing findings and conclusions regarding the methodological link 
between the RMET and EFT, our results are in general consistent with the causal link between 
WCC and ToM proposed by Jarrold et al., though our model is slightly different. WCC has been 
conceptualized as an epiphenomenon of a more basic adaptive neural mechanism, a 
compensatory response to reduced attentional selectivity in ASC (Belmonte & Yurgelun-Todd, 
2003). This same attentional issue hinders early joint attention and, some say, ToM (Charman, 
2003). (Such a link between attention and social cognition is partly supported by our principal 
components analysis, wherein the attention switching subdomain of the AQ loaded on the first 
principal component with communication, imagination, and social skills, whilst attention to 
detail was the sole subdomain loading on the second component; this view is reinforced by the 
negative albeit non-significant correlation between AQAtt subscores and the RMET). The same 
compensatory cognitive style that leads to quicker figure disembedding, then, may also 
compensate for face processing difficulties by allowing men to systemize emotional and facial 
recognition through piecemeal processing of facial features. This ability to systemize empathy – 
and to get away with it without incurring significant social cognitive deficits – may distinguish 
the population of “extreme”, yet normal, males from the autism-spectrum population. Normal 
females in our sample were actually closer to ASC in this sense, as disembedding was associated 
with more “autistic” communication and social skills traits, suggesting less ability to systemize 
social situations. 
Sex-dependent E/S covariance structures notwithstanding, these data are generally 
inconsistent with the predictions of EMB and E/S theories. No sex differences arose on any 
measures except for 2D:4D ratio (a well established difference that is independent of EMB and 
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E/S theories) and go/no-go reaction time. This overall lack of sex differences is consistent with 
the lack of sex differences on the RMET and EFT found by Jarrold et al. (2000), but not with 
Voracek and Dressler’s (2006, 423 subjects) or Carroll and Chiew’s (2006, 48 subjects) findings 
of RMET and AQ sex differences (the latter study found no difference on the EFT, however). 
The absolute difference between male and female AQ scores in the current study exceeded that 
of Voracek and Dressler but was based on a sample less than a third as large, suggesting that an 
AQ sex difference may indeed exist but as a vanishingly small effect.  The lack of RMET sex 
difference is more puzzling. One possibility is that our selective sampling method yielded a 
greater proportion of women in the highest systemizing fields and men in the highest 
empathizing fields than a truly random sample would have done; only men in the highest 
systemizing fields had lower RMET scores than women in the highest systemizing fields, 
whereas men in high empathizing fields had the highest scores of any group by more than a 
point, on average. Thus, male and female mean scores may have been slightly skewed toward 
one another due to artefacts of our particular sample. 
These findings raise issues with the construct validity of AQ subdomains as distinct 
measures of empathizing and systemizing. On face, our replication of Hoekstra et al.’s PCA of 
AQ subdomains supports E/S theory. A fairly clean split was evident between the first and 
second principal components, which roughly translate into empathizing and systemizing, 
respectively. Additionally, the empathizing component includes attention switching (which, we 
have argued, may underlie empathizing deficits). However, our cognitive measures (EFT in 
females, Benton and RMET in males) correlate with only the first component. The second 
component is neither inversely related to Benton and RMET scores (as a single-axis E/S factor 
space would predict), nor inversely related to EFT response latencies (as both single- and dual-
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axis models would predict) in either sex. This is perhaps because subdomains comprising the 
first component contain questions posed in social contexts, whereas none of the questions 
comprising the details/patterns subdomain are.  
This social contextual distinction may help explain the aforementioned “clean split” 
between the two principal components along empathizing and systemizing lines. Explaining how 
the Social Interaction component predicts WCC does not require appeals to theoretical 
relationships between social and non-social domains, as the Social Interaction subdomains 
directly indicate WCC as much as they do social, attentional, and imaginative deficits. Two 
examples from the AQAtt and AQImag subdomains illustrate these explanations: “I can easily 
keep track of several different people’s conversations”, and “I find it easy to make up stories”. 
While the first question does relate to attention switching ability, it is posed in a social context; 
likewise, making up stories requires some concept of how fictional characters would interact 
socially. Both these questions exemplify a social skill/WCC confound; keeping track of 
simultaneous conversations would be near impossible if one attempted to follow each word-for-
word; instead, the “gist” or central coherence of each is extracted from the bits and pieces that 
reach awareness. As for the second question, stories, like conversations, are narratives with 
central coherence, not randomly assembled statements.   
On the other hand, our post hoc AQ subdomain factor analyses revealed a sex difference 
in factor structure that is supported by our findings of empathizing and systemizing dependence 
in men, and independence in women. In men, there was overlap between subdomains; while the 
first component was similar to that of the full sample PCA, the second component included the 
Details subdomain, but also had positive Communication and Social Skills loadings. If the 
overlap between AQ subdomains were methodological rather than empirical, then one would 
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expect sex to be irrelevant to the amount of overlap between principal components; instead, more 
overlap was present for men than women, just as empathizing and systemizing were generally 
more related in men than in women according to our cognitive measures as well. 
2.6 Conclusion  
Empathizing and systemizing are largely independent in women, but largely dependent in 
men. Systemizing ability was coupled with sacrifices in social abilities in men but not in women 
in our sample, except insofar as men supplemented empathizing with systemizing, utilizing their 
disembedding skills to process faces. The flip side of this conclusion is that males who are poor 
systemizers may also be poor at some empathizing abilities. 
Moreover, when females enter science, they seem to do so as much when they are good 
systemizers as when they are poor empathizers, whereas – at least according to this study's set of 
measures – men seem to enter science more specifically when they have empathizing difficulties. 
Despite the relationships between men's weaker empathizing skills and their stronger 
systemizing skills, when it comes to selecting an occupation men's choices may be determined 
more by their weaknesses than by their strengths: men's choice of a scientific field of study is 
associated with weakness in empathizing skills as indexed by the AQ Communication, Social, 
and Imagination subscales. All these relationships of course, exist at the level of populations, and 
all are correlational, and so it would be a fallacy and an injustice to use them to make 
proclamations about individuals and/or causal directions. 
2.7 Relevance to Work Two 
Within E-S theory’s assumption of social/cognitive co-variance lies the secondary 
assumption that such E-S co-variance applies indiscriminately to both ‘male’ and ‘female’ ends 
of the E-S spectrum, with females exhibiting the high empathizing-low systemizing counterpart 
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to the low empathizing-high systemizing pattern characterizing males and ASC individuals. The 
broader importance of this study with regard to the present thesis, then, lies in the sex-dependent 
nature of the E-S co-variance patterns that arose in this experiment. Thus, contrary to the framing 
of the E-S co-variance hypothesis as a unilateral question of evidence for/against, E-S co-
variance may instead be greater or more likely at the male/autistic than at the female end of the 
E-S spectrum.  
In the next chapter, the ideas about sex differences in empathizing, systemizing, E-S co-
variance, and field of study explored in this chapter are examined from the perspective of 
underlying biology and its downstream developmental effects. Specifically, we review evidence 
related to prenatal hormonal influences on neuroarchitectural organization, and whether such 
influences can account for the downstream sex difference patterns seen typically developing 
adults in the previous chapter; more specifically, we focus on evidence from studies utilizing an 
increasingly popular proxy measure of prenatal androgen exposure, 2nd-to-4th digit length ratio. 
Based on this body of evidence we argue, among other things, that the sex-dependent E-S Co-
variance seen in the previous work may be rooted in sexually dimorphic timescales of androgen-
related neuroarchitectural organization, and sex-dependent developmental trajectories of E-S Co-
variance that result from such sexually dimorphic timescales.
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CHAPTER 3 
BRAIN ORGANIZATION THEORY, DIGIT RATIO (2D/4D), AND SEX DIFFERENCES IN 
PREFERENCES AND COGNITION 
3.1 Introduction 
Women’s growth in the scientific workforce has been meteoric over the past 40 years, 
with increases of several orders of magnitude (Ceci & Williams, 2010a,b).  For example, in 1970 
fewer than 5% of scientific and medical doctorates were awarded to women, but by 2006 
approximately 50% of MDs and 48-51% of PhDs in biology were being awarded to women, as 
were 76% of doctorates in veterinary medicine, and 67% of PhDs in psychology.  
However, there is one glaring exception to women’s progress in scientific careers.  In 
fields that are highly quantitative, women’s success has been far less pronounced. In 2006 less 
than a third of the PhDs in highly quantitative fields were awarded to women: mathematics-
29.6%, computer science-21.3%, physical sciences-29%, engineering-20.2% (Burrelli, 2008, 
Table 1). In the top 100 U.S. universities, only 8.8% (mechanical engineering) to 15.8 
(astronomy) % of all professorial ranks combined in many quantitative fields are occupied by 
women (Nelson & Brammer, 2010, Table 11). Among full professors, women usually number < 
10%: chemistry—9.7%, mathematics—7.1%, computer science—10.3%, physics—6.1%, 
chemical engineering—7.3%, civil engineering—7.1%, electrical engineering—5.7%, 
mechanical engineering—4.4%, and economics—8.7%. The reason for women’s lower 
representation in these fields has been the source of heated debate (Ceci & Williams, in press; 
Shalala, Agogino, Bailyn, Birgeneau, Cauce, Deangeles, et al., 2007; Sommers, 2008) and, like 
many other controversies in the social policy realm (e.g., violence, addiction, sexual orientation), 
has been framed in terms of the relative influence of nature versus nurture, although recently it 
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has been recast in terms of a biopsychological vs. main effects view of sex differences in which 
biological factors are enmeshed with social forces in an iterative unfolding (Berenbaum & 
Resnick, 2007; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; Guo & Stearns, 2002; Halpern, Benbow, Geary, 
Gur, Hyde, & Gernsbacher, 2007). 
To be sure, neither side contends a mutual exclusivity of nature or nurture in explaining 
the relatively slow progress made by women in math-intensive fields, but their emphases are 
clearly at opposite poles (Ceci & Williams, 2007).  One side emphasizes sociocultural factors as 
primary, such as early socialization practices, and biased teachers’ and parents’ attitudes toward 
girls and mathematics, with a resultant stereotype threat and discriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices, and “chilly work climate”. This side deemphasizes biological sex differences in ability 
(Shalala et al., 2007; Spelke, 2005), and points to rapid changes in the proportions of females 
scoring at the extreme right tail of the mathematics distribution (i.e., those scoring in the top 
.01% or 1 in 10,000), from 13:1 in the early 1980s to 4:1 by the mid-1990s, where it has 
remained since (Wai, Cacchio, Putallaz, & Makel, 2010). Indeed, such dramatic changes over 
such a brief time period are inconsistent with mathematical ability tightly controlled by biology, 
but more consistent with Hyde’s Gender Similarity Hypothesis (Hyde, 2005; Else-Quest, Hyde, 
& Linn, 2010). Additionally, proponents of sociocultural explanations point to the large variance 
in cross-cultural analyses, with females outperforming males in some countries (see Ceci, 
Williams, & Barnett, 2009; Else-Quest et al., 2010), and the best predictor of international sex 
differences is the degree to which its citizens exhibit implicit gender-science stereotypes (Nosek, 
B. A., Smyth, F. L., Sriram, N., Lindner, N. M., Devos, T., Ayala, A., Bar-Anan, Y., et al. 2009).  
In contrast, those who assign a greater role to biology stress hormonal, neural, and genetic 
factors that are alleged to result in a male advantage in spatial and mathematical abilities (for 
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review of genetics and hormone findings, see Ceci et al., 2009; Ceci & Williams, 2010). Also, 
logically, biology cannot be ruled out on the basis of temporal changes or transnational 
differences because even highly heritable characteristics such as height are sensitive to 
environmental changes but the existence of these changes is still compatible with high 
heritabilities (Ceci, 1996). Due to greater male variability that is alleged to be biologically-based, 
the farther out on either tail, the higher the ratio of males to females. (Male variance in 
mathematical and spatial performance is with some exceptions 10-20% greater than female 
variance, reflected in greater asymmetries at the tails of the distribution. Notwithstanding greater 
male variability in most studies, this sex difference in variability is not ubiquitous and can vary 
with culture and gender equality attitudes—see Feingold, 1994; Hyde & Mertz, 2009; Penner, 
2008.) 
The discussion that follows focuses on the most popular biological account of women’s 
underrepresentation in math-intensive fields of science—namely, the putative role of prenatal 
exposure to hormones such as sex steroids (the most important being testosterone) on early brain 
organization, which in turn leads to sex differences in spatial and mathematical abilities as well 
as to a plethora of other outcomes (personality, sexual orientation, interests). This sexually 
dimorphic brain organization hypothesis (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2003), termed “brain organization 
theory”, posits that male brain physiology is inherently “built” for efficient spatial and 
quantitative processing by these sex steroids. Sex steroids increase lateralization and a bias 
toward right hemispheric processing, the right hemisphere being the preferentially involved in 
spatial and numerical processes, particularly those dealing with abstract numerical relations 
(Baron-Cohen, 2003). It is also argued by advocates of the biological position that steroids 
render the male brain more sensitive to the activational effects of testosterone. This may result 
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not only in better ability to undertake 3-dimensional spatial rotation, but also in a host of 
behavioral changes such as higher risk taking, search persistence, and heightened vigilance and 
faster reaction times. Meanwhile, inherently female brain physiology is said to be “built” for 
language fluency, empathy, emotion recognition, and other processes that involve more inter-
hemispheric coordination, having reduced lateralization and an overall bias toward left 
hemispheric processing.  
We begin with a précis of the evidence for sex differences in mathematical and spatial 
ability. Following this, we describe the dominant biological and sociocultural arguments put 
forward to account for them, focusing especially on claims that in utero hormone exposure 
organizes brains differently in males and females, leading to male advantages in math and spatial 
cognition. These claims of prenatal hormone influence are then evaluated in the context of 
studies (summarized in Table 7) relying on a putative biomarker of prenatal hormone exposure, 
the length ratio of the index (second) to ring (fourth) finger, or 2D/4D ratio. We argue that 
despite a wealth of 2D/4D-based evidence supporting brain organization theory, there remains 
very significant inconsistencies and contradictions in the 2D/4D literature. We conclude by 
arguing that these issues mirror the larger issues plaguing brain organization theory as a whole; 
that despite evidence of the role of early brain organization in women’s underrepresentation in 
mathematically-intensive careers, there remains very significant inconsistencies and 
contradictions. We then point out numerous alternative explanations of key findings that will 
have to be resolved for early brain organization theory to be a compelling account of sex 
differences across cognitive, social, behavioral, and sexual domains. 
3.2 Evidence of Sex Differences in Mathematics and Spatial Ability 
Hundreds of published studies have reported sex differences in mathematical and spatial 
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ability. The general pattern of findings is one of overall male superiority when it comes to 
extreme ability at the right tail of the distribution; but the size of the right tail sex differences 
vary by sample and particularly by culture (Feingold 1994; Hyde & Mertz, 2009). In addition, 
extreme right tail sex differences can be contrasted with mean performance, where sex 
differences are small or non-existent. Effect sizes for male superiority in 3-dimensional mental 
rotation—an ability that has been circumstantially linked to some forms of mathematical 
prowess—usually fall in the moderate to large range (e.g., in a number of large meta-analyses, ds 
~ 0.50 to 0.80). Illustrative are the various meta-analyses reported by Hyde and her colleagues. 
Hyde (2005) synthesized 128 effect sizes on a broad range of measures from 47 published meta-
analyses and reported large effects for mental rotation and mechanical reasoning favoring males 
(ds between .56 and .76). Other forms of spatial ability, however, do not exhibit consistent male 
superiority, such as rotation of 2-dimensional figures, and still others tend to be associated with 
female superiority, such as spatial memory. So while there is a general male superiority in the 
extreme right tail from which the professorial scientific workforce is drawn, caveats such as 
distinguishing between extreme right tail and mean sex difference, and inconsistencies such as 
the 3-D male advantage but not a 2-D advantage, are recurring themes in the sex difference 
literature. 
Along the same lines, hundreds of studies document male superiority for mathematical 
ability—if that is defined as a score on one of the national or international aptitude tests such as 
the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), or the 
SAT-Mathematics (SAT-M).  Again, there are many caveats, most notably that early 
mathematical sex differences are nil or even favor females (Ceci et al., 2009). This has been 
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attributed by some to the role of the left hemisphere in learning basic arithmetic concepts 
(Brosnan, 2006). Young girls’ sometimes superior performance in math, in other words, is 
purportedly influenced by their superior ability to learn and remember things verbally, and is 
thus more a matter of memorization and verbal ability than inborn mathematical ability (though 
see later argument against a verbal account of the female grade advantage in mathematics 
courses). However, beginning around middle school, the effect sizes for male superiority appear 
and increase throughout high school. To some, this trend suggests a developmental convergence 
of a sex difference in sensitivity to activational effects of testosterone, determined prenatally, and 
increased levels of testosterone in males during this middle school-age, pubertal period. 
A related source of the inconsistency is the nature of the mathematics being tested at 
different ages, with the more abstract and complex math being associated the largest effect sizes 
in favor of males. In fact, at any given age, the items that are most difficult are associated with 
the largest male superiority (e.g., Ceci et al., 2009; OECD, 2004).  Relatedly, sex differences in 
mathematics depend critically on not only the type of math being tested and at what age, but also 
on where in the score distribution one looks: As noted, there are no systematic sex differences at 
the midpoint of the distribution, but fairly large differences at the extreme tails, both right and 
left. Among the top 1% of students on standardized mathematics tests, there are approximately 2 
males for every female, and this ratio has been found across a wide variety of nationally 
representative samples (e.g., Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams, 2008, n=7 million US 
students in various grades; Lohman & Lakin, 2009, n=318,599 9-11-year-olds; Strand et al., 
2006, n=320,000 11-year-olds; Mullis, Martin, Fierros, Goldberg, & Stemler, 2000, n= .5 
million; Wai et al., 2010, n=1.6 million 7th graders). Because overall male score variability is 
roughly .15 SD greater than females’, the farther out on either tail, the higher the ratio of males 
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to females. During the 2006-2010 period, in a non-random sample of 7th grade perfect-800 
scorers on the SAT-M, there were 6.58 males for every female (Wai et al., 2010). In the past 20 
years, there have been 37 perfect scorers among 7th graders on the ACT-Science test, 36 of 
whom were male. 
A final source of inconsistency revolves around the achievement-aptitude distinction. 
Females get better grades in mathematics classes than males throughout high school and college 
(Gallagher & Kaufman, 2005); males outperform females at the right tail of aptitude tests such as 
the SAT-M, the GRE-Q, and the NAEP. This has led to claims and counterclaims of bias, with 
one side arguing that aptitude measures such as the SAT-M underpredict female performance in 
math classes, and the other side arguing that classroom teachers are biased against males because 
they receive grades below what are predicted from their aptitude scores (Ceci et al., 2009). For 
example, in a study of 47,000 college mathematics students, of whom 14,019 males and 10,087 
females took calculus, males who received grades of D and F had SAT-M scores equal to women 
who received grades of B. The average SAT-M gap between males and females in calculus was 
38 points (Wainer & Steinberg, 1992, Table 3, column 2). The difficulty in distinguishing 
between achievement and aptitude underpins much of the controversy. As noted by others (e.g., 
Ceci, 1996; Halpern et al., 2007), it is both conceptually and empirically difficult to measure 
ability without also measuring achievement to some extent, leading some to “use the term ability 
as it was defined by Fleishman (1972): a general trait of an individual that is the product of 
learning and development.” (Halpern et al., 2007, p. 3). 
3.3 The Putatively Causal Role of Brain Organization Theory in Math and Spatial 
Performance 
To recap, ample evidence exists that, notwithstanding important caveats about where in 
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the score distribution, and at what age, and on what types of tests are considered, males generally 
outperform females on math and spatial tasks linked to math achievement, and the effect sizes of 
these differences are substantial. Moreover, some take these sex differences in math and spatial 
ability as part of a constellation of sex differences that support a particular nature-based theory, 
the so-called brain organization theory, in which hormones, particularly prenatal exposure to 
male hormones, are said to induce sexually dimorphic brain organization patterns that manifest 
in personality, toy preferences, sexual orientation, activity level, aggression, cognitive profile, 
and sex differences in education and occupations (for review of the myriad manifestations of 
male hormones, see Jordan-Young, 2010).  
According to callosal theory (Witelson & Nowakowski, 1991), prenatal testosterone 
mediates early axon pruning in callosal tissue, and thus the more testosterone a brain is exposed 
to in utero, the more lateralization there is; evidence of less lateralization in females supports this 
assertion (Wiesniewski, 1998). In addition, prenatal testosterone is alleged to encourage right 
hemisphere growth, while simultaneously slowing left hemisphere growth (Geschwind & 
Galaburda, 1987). In sum, prenatal level of testosterone is viewed as the X factor in the 
relationship between sex and an androgen-induced brain organization well-suited for 
mathematical and spatial problem solving. For the remainder of the manuscript we focus on a 
particular, morphologically-based body of evidence used with increasing frequency, usually in 
support of the argument that sex differences in mathematical and spatial performance are 
influenced by prenatal brain androgenization.  
3.4 Testing Brain Organization Theory: 2D/4D as a Proxy for Prenatal Testosterone Levels  
Although the cognitive effects of prenatal hormones are unclear, these same hormones do 
without question affect the growth of body regions, including the symmetry of limbs and digits, 
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as well as the urogentialia, during gestation.  One such effect is the length ratio of the index 
(second) finger vis-à-vis ring (fourth) finger. Since increasing levels of prenatal testosterone 
exposure lead to greater relative length in the fourth digit compared to the second digit 
(Manning, 2002), the 2D/4D ratio is viewed by many as a proxy for the relative level of prenatal 
testosterone exposure in utero. Because the brain organization patterns outlined by brain 
organization theory arise around the same time as digit length determination (during the first 
trimester or early in the second trimester of pregnancy), 2D/4D ratio, the logic goes, provides a 
rough idea of the amount of lateralization occurring during this organizational period (Brosnan, 
2006).  More specifically, homeobox genes (HOXA and HOXD in particular), activated around 
the 14th week of gestation and responsible for differentiation of both gonads and digit growth 
(Kondo, Zakany, Innis, & Duboule, 1997), are viewed as the basis of the prenatal testosterone-
digit ratio link.  
Convergent validation of 2D/4D as a proxy measure of relative hormone levels comes 
from findings indicating that digit ratio is correlated with the testosterone-to-estrogen ratio found 
in amniotic fluid (Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen, Raggatt, Knickmeyer, & Manning, 2004). Lower 
2D/4D ratios are characteristically male (0.98, on average, compared to the female average of 1), 
a result of greater prenatal testosterone. Moreover, low 2D/4D in males is associated with many 
of the same traits typically associated with current (as opposed to prenatal) testosterone levels, 
such as reproductive success (Manning, Barley, Walton, Lewis-Jones, Trivers, Singh et al., 
2000) and high sperm counts, but also cognitive ability and left hand preference. Similarly, in 
women 2D/4D is positively related to estrogen levels, and a low (male-like) 2D/4D is predictive 
of female homosexuality (Okten, et al., 2002). 2D/4D even predicts age of onset of breast cancer 
in women (Manning & Leinster, 2001). 
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The 2D/4D ratio is relatively stable from 2 years of age onward, and circulatory (current) 
testosterone levels are unrelated to this ratio, meaning that 2D/4D is an indication of prenatal 
hormone levels specifically, rather than hormone levels in general (Hönekopp, Bartholdt, Beier, 
& Liebert, 2007). Thus, 2D/4D ratio is now commonly used as a reliable proxy measure of 
prenatal hormone levels.   
3.5 Evidence for Biologically-Based Cognitive Sex Differences From 2D/4D Studies   
Taking evidence in the literature at face value, 2D/4D studies do generally support Brain 
Organization Theory. Although most of the significant 2D/4D-psychometric correlations in the 
literature have small effect sizes, as can be seen in Table 7 the magnitude of several effect sizes 
are in the moderate to large range (e.g., Brosnan 2006, 2008; Table 7). Upon closer inspection, 
however, the evidence for a link between prenatal hormones and spatial and numerical abilities 
provided by studies using the 2D/4D ratio is as equivocal as the cognitive sex difference findings 
reviewed above, in three ways outlined briefly here and elaborated in detail below. First, while 
some studies indicate the linear relationship between 2D/4D ratio and spatial/mathematical 
ability that is predicted by Brain Organization Theory, other studies indicate an inverse-U 
relationship between 2D/4D and spatial (specifically 3-D mental rotation) and numerical 
abilities. In the latter studies, optimal levels of prenatal testosterone for spatial abilities fall in the 
low-male/high-female range. Second, whether the relationship between the 2D/4D ratio and 
spatial/ mathematical abilities is quadratic or linear, some studies indicate that prenatal brain 
organization pathways and/or timing of those pathways may be sexually differentiated. This is 
because some 2D/4D studies have alternately indicated that 2D/4D ratio predicts 
spatial/numerical abilities in males but not in females, or in females but not in males. 
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Table 7. Summary of Cognition-Related 2D/4D Studies Reviewed 
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 Last, some 2D/4D studies indicate that prenatal hormone exposure may be equally (or 
more) responsible for inherent spatial and numerical preferences than for actual ability in these 
domains. In this scenario, androgenization of the brain may tilt early preferred play toward 
spatial activities (block-building, gross motor play) which may foster later spatial and numerical 
achievement, as some sex difference research indicates (Ceci et al., 2009). The implication of 
this last point is that the influence of prenatal testosterone on mathematical abilities is played out 
post-natally, and through experientially rather than innately-garnered abilities. This last 
possibility is particularly important in the broader context of underrepresentation of women in 
math-intensive fields, and may help reconcile the nature and nurture sides of this larger debate 
(e.g., Halpern, 2004; Shonkoff, Phillips, et al; National Research Council, 2000). This is because 
although it concedes a biologically based sex difference, it is a sex difference that is more 
amenable to counteraction via intervention than innate differences in ability might imply to 
some. In other words, if the real sex difference is one of preference for spatial play, and not 
ability, then ameliorating the problem of underrepresentation may be a matter of influencing 
girls’ preferences before their biological potentials in math suffer from the snowballing effects of 
early preferences. 
3.5.1 The Inverse-U Relationship Between the 2D/4D Ratio and Spatial/Numerical Abilities 
The idea of an inverse-U relationship between prenatal testosterone exposure levels and 
spatial/mathematical ability is not new, nor is it confined to 2D/4D-based interpretations (see 
Brosnan, 2006). For instance, it has been hypothesized that, while increasing levels of 
testosterone may foster right hemisphere growth and accompanying spatial ability, too much 
testosterone could slow growth in both hemispheres, leading to decreases in spatial ability 
(Geschwind & Galaburda, 1987, cited in Brosnan, 2006). 
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Albeit speculative, some evidence from 2D/4D studies is consistent with this possibility. 
For instance, in one study 2D/4D ratio was significantly related to field of study among 
university faculty (Brosnan, 2006): science faculty members were found to have a more feminine 
(higher) 2D/4D ratio compared to social science/humanities/management faculty. 
Notwithstanding this intriguing finding, however, engineering faculty in this study had digit 
ratios between, and not significantly different than, those of science and social 
science/humanities/management faculty, despite engineering presumably requiring more spatial 
and math skills than many fields of science such as biology, save those subfields within it that 
are highly quantitative such as computational and population biology. A similar curvilinear 
relationship has been shown between salivary testosterone and spatial abilities such as 3-D 
mental rotation (Moffatt & Hampson, 1996), though as previously noted circulatory testosterone 
levels are distinct from prenatal (organizational) levels.  A U-shaped, rather than inverse U-
shaped, pattern has also characterized correlations between prenatal testosterone levels 
(measured via amniocentesis) and the amount of eye contact made with a parent (Lutchmaya, 
Baron-Cohen, & Raggatt, 2002). Such a relationship is said to typify the “female brain”, which is 
touted as the converse of the purported relationship between testosterone and spatial/numerical 
ability. This "female brain" relationship is viewed as complementary evidence for a testosterone-
spatial ability causal link. However, citing such a finding as support for an inverse-U relationship 
between hormones and spatial/numerical ability assumes not only direct relationships between 
preference and ability, and between early preference and later ability, but it also assumes that 
spatial/numerical and emotional/interpersonal abilities are inversely related, which remains an 
open question (Valla et al., 2010). 
Yet there is still further evidence for an inverse-U relationship from other digit ratio 
 45 
studies in the literature. For instance, studies have found a U-shaped relationship between 
targeting latency and 2D/4D ratio, such that extremely low and extremely high digit ratios were 
related to more time needed to accurately move a cursor to a target stimulus (Falter, Arroyo, & 
Davis, 2006). However, the same study found a direct, linear relationship between 2D/4D ratio 
and spatial ability as measured with a perceptual disembedding task. This calls into question the 
generality of the relationship and suggests that targeting entails specific operations that go 
beyond spatial, such as eye-hand coordination that may be influenced by playing dynamic 
videogames.  
The numerical and mental rotation skills of females in another study appeared to benefit 
from a 2D/4D ratio in the low (more masculine) female range, while digit ratios in the high 
(more feminine) male range benefited males' numerical abilities (Kempel et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, however, no complementary relationships were found for verbal ability, which 
might be expected if prenatal testosterone diminishes left hemisphere growth (Geschwind & 
Galaburda, 1987). Lastly, male digit ratios have also correlated positively with performance in 
university science classes, with class performance related to more feminine digit ratios among 
male science students (Romano, Leoni, & Saino, 2006). However, the authors note that the 
positive correlation found for male students may have been an artifact of the oral and written 
nature of many of the course assignments and exams. Such assessments, the argument goes, 
favor verbal over spatial/numerical skills. However, this study was done with Italian university 
students in a system that uses verbal assessments of math and science far more heavily than is 
true of mathematical assessments in the U.S., which tend to require algebraic manipulation and 
the ability to draw graphs rather than language expression. This claim of female grade 
superiority as a result of verbal assessment procedures has been argued to explain away female 
 46 
superiority in mathematical aptitude. (Ceci & Williams, 2010). However, such verbally-laden 
mathematics assessment is found more at younger ages where word problems predominate pre-
algebra than among more advanced mathematics courses at which females continue to excel. 
Thus this body of evidence favoring the hormone-math/spatial/2D/4D linkage has been fraught 
with inconsistent findings and equivocal interpretations. 
Evidence for a quadratic relationship between 2D/4D and spatial skills from 
investigations using functional lateralization has been similarly conflicting. In these studies, 
functional lateralization is inferred from response time differences between numerical 
recognition trials in which response keys were in the same versus opposite direction as the 
mental, analogical magnitude representation of numbers along a number line (left=lower 
magnitude, right=higher magnitude) This difference, also known as the SNARC (Spatial 
Numerical Association of Response Codes) may be preferable to using batteries of 
spatial/numerical tests for two reasons. First, the spatial analog of magnitude used in this 
paradigm is viewed by some as a metacognitive Rosetta Stone for transformations between 
various modes of numerical and spatial processing (auditory, visual Arabic, etc.). Second, and in 
terms of digit ratio studies in particular, functional lateralization may be a better intermediary 
between digit ratio and physical hemispheric lateralization than batteries of spatial/numerical 
tests. Thus SNARC evidence warrants special attention. 
In one SNARC study, individuals with lower digit ratios exhibited greater degrees of 
functional lateralization than their high digit ratio counterparts, supporting the brain organization 
hypothesis (Bull & Benson, 2006). Importantly, however, this conclusion was not based on 
correlations, but rather on a comparison of “low” and “high” digit ratio distinctions based on 
median splits. The male median ratio was approximately 0.96, so even some individuals 
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categorized as having a “high” digit ratio may have had lower than average (which is 0.98 for 
males) ratios. At the same time, female ratios in this sample were low as well (median split of 
approx. 0.98), which may have balanced any male ratio biases in the analyses, which were 
performed on the full, mixed-sex sample. Thus the interpretation is ambiguous and could be the 
result of the sex distribution around the cut-off. (On a side note, sample representativeness is also 
an issue in Kempel et al. (2005) described above, particularly in their male sample, where the 
mean digit ratio was below average (approx. 0.96); thus, the “high” male range of digit ratio in 
this study may actually be average or below average compared to the normative population.) 
Neave, Hamilton, and Fink (2007) reported the results of an analogous SNARC study to 
Bull and Benson’s (i.e., greater lateralization) in females with low (masculine) digit ratios, and 
men with high (feminine) digit ratios on a test of subitizing. Their findings, in contrast to Bull 
and Benson's (2006), appear to fit the quadratic relationship model, in that females who were at 
the masculine end of the female distribution, and males who were at the feminine end of the male 
distribution were more functionally lateralized.  
3.5.2 Sexually Dimorphic Brain Organization Pathways and Timescales? 
An alternative way of explaining the 2D/4D data reviewed here is that males’ and 
females’ prenatal brain organization processes are affected differently by the same prenatal 
hormones. For instance, one study found the expected negative  correlation between digit ratio 
and numerical competence in boys aged 6-11, but no such relationship for females (Fink, 
Brookes, Neave, Manning, & Geary, 2006). In another investigation, boys’ digit ratios 
significantly predicted their absolute (Z numerical score) and relative (Z numerical – Z verbal) 
numerical scores on National Standard Assessment Tests in the United Kingdom. However, girls' 
digit ratios only predicted their absolute verbal abilities, with high digit ratio related to high 
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verbal ability. Similarly, digit ratio significantly predicted male, but not female performance in 
science classes (Romano et al., 2006). Meanwhile, prenatal testosterone measured via amniotic 
fluid from between the 14th and 20th weeks of gestation has been negatively correlated with 
girls’, but not boys' later numerical competence (Finegan, Nichols, & Sitarenios, 1992). On the 
other hand, a recent study found an expected inverse correlation between digit ratio and 
spatial/numerical skills associated with an individual’s undergraduate major in females, but not 
in males (Valla et al., 2010). 
Although Fink et al. (2006) cite Finegan et al.’s study to support the claim that prenatal 
hormones differentially affect males and females, they question these findings due to the fact that 
prenatal testosterone levels in Finegan et al.’s study were from later in gestation than when 
2D/4D is determined, thus raising the temporal asynchrony argument. Along these lines, it may 
even be the case that the lack of effects for females, but not males, in some of the above studies 
is due to different sensitive periods for prenatal brain organization in males and females. The 
curious findings in Finegan et al., then, may have been due to a female sensitive/critical period 
which is later in the gestational timetable than males’. Thus, a negative relationship between 
prenatal testosterone at approximately 16 weeks (the mean measurement time point in their 
study) and later numerical competence may indicate that prenatal testosterone is detrimental to 
females’ numerical abilities, in contrast with the assumption that comparatively high prenatal 
testosterone (compared to other females’ hormone levels) improves females’ numerical abilities. 
Indeed, it would be consistent with these findings to argue that prenatal testosterone exposure 
may hinder any potential, presumably delateralized, alternative strategies females typically use 
for solving mathematical problems.  
Questions of detrimental effects aside, there is additional support for sexually 
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differentiated brain organization critical periods that may explain the inconsistency in the 
predictive power of 2D/4D ratios in females’ spatial/numerical abilities. For instance, in one 
study the spatial abilities (as measured by three tests: the Vandenberg Mental Rotations test, the 
Paper Folding test, and the Guilford-Zimmerman Spatial Orientation Test) of females who were 
classified as non-heterosexual were significantly higher than those of heterosexual females (Van 
Anders & Hampson, 2005). However, these same females’ digit ratios were unrelated to their 
scores on all three spatial tests, and there was no difference between the digit ratios of the 
heterosexual and non-heterosexual females. Commenting on the developmental asynchrony of 
the 2D/4D ratio and spatial ability for both sexes, Puts, McDaniel, Jordan, and Breedlove (2008) 
suggest that sexual orientation may be more contemporaneous with spatial ability than the 
2D/4D ratio. Even if true, however, this leaves a lacuna in the early brain organization position, 
which posits a positive manifold of correlations between all biomarkers by the onset of early 
adolescence. 
3.5.3 Prenatally-Determined Ability, or Prenatally-Determined Preference? 
There is also the possibility that the inconsistent relationship between prenatal 
testosterone (as measured by the 2D/4D ratio) and spatial and numerical competencies is due to 
an alternative pathway of influence of prenatal testosterone on spatial/numerical cognition.  
Namely, prenatal testosterone may affect preferences rather than directly establishing ability. 
Inconsistent findings, then, might be a function of the fact that, while ability and preference can 
go hand-in-hand, this is not always the case. For example, when presented with arrays of 
masculine and feminine objects and toys, men and women who showed more fixation on 
masculine objects had better targeting abilities and lower 2D/4D ratios (Alexander, 2006). In the 
same study, however, visual fixation times were unrelated to mental rotation ability, in both 
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sexes. In addition, there was no difference between individuals with higher masculine object 
fixations and those with higher feminine object fixations in retrospective reports of gender-linked 
childhood activities. Weis, Firker, and Hennig (2007) gave participants occupational interest 
inventories in addition to measuring their digit ratios. In males, there was a negative correlation 
between 2D/4D ratio and interest in “Realistic” and “Enterprising” careers, while females’ digit 
ratios were negatively correlated with interests in “Enterprising” and “Investigative” careers. It 
would be hard to argue a priori that “Realistic” typifies math-intensive careers any more than 
“Investigative”. 
These empirical attempts to unravel digit ratio correlations with preference versus ability 
are consistent with the causal pathway hypothesized by Ceci et al., (2009) to exacerbate inherent, 
but initially very small, sex differences in spatial and numerical domains. Others have shown a 
“snowball effect” whereby initial cognitive ability breeds preference, which feeds back into 
enlarged ability differences (Dickens & Flynn, 2001), but it is equally easy to hypothesize that 
inherent preference spawns ability differences, before feeding back into still greater differences 
in preference.  
At the same time, Alexander’s (2006) findings imply a more powerful idea than this 
"snowball" causal model, because the finding that digit ratio was related to masculine/ feminine 
object preferences but not to mental rotation ability, coupled with the fact that no mental rotation 
ability differences existed between individuals preferring masculine versus feminine objects, 
suggests the possibility that preference and ability can be dissociated, even into adulthood. More 
importantly, it suggests that the influence of sex difference due to prenatal testosterone exposure 
is not directly on ability, but emerges as a function of interest. Given that no childhood activity 
differences existed between those preferring masculine versus feminine objects, this suggests 
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that children’s play preferences may be (in cases of dissociation between interest and ability) 
functions of interest, and not ability. One possible explanation for this is that play activities are 
influenced by socialization, but socialization may not alter preferences, which may be rooted in 
prenatal testosterone exposure. Relatedly, behaviors such as risk-taking and vigilance that are 
associated with early testosterone and a lower male digit ratio are relevant in financial trading, 
where male ratios predicted profit and loss records of 49 traders in London (Coates, Gurnell, & 
Rustichini, 2009).  
A recent example of the inherent ambiguity involved in distinguishing between results 
due to prenatal testosterone exposure versus subsequent activities is the study reported by 
Vuoksimaa et al. (2010) in which she and her colleagues concluded that "We...found that 
females with male co-twins outperformed females with female co-twins (on a mental rotation 
test). Our results are consistent with the prenatal masculinization hypothesis, according to which 
masculinization occurs in females with male co-twins as a result of intrauterine exposure to 
testosterone." Notwithstanding the authors’ statement, it appeared to be the case that having a 
female co-twin enhanced the mental rotation ability of her male co-twin  (it was not clear from 
their figure 1 if this effect was significant). If significant, one could just as readily claim that 
feminization is good for mental rotation ability, calling further into question the welter of 
expected correlations between prenatal hormones, sex differences in spatial ability, and the digit 
ratio.  Or, alternatively, one could claim that having a male co-twin enhanced females’ 
subsequent spatial ability because of the subsequent influence of being exposed to male activities 
(blocks, erector sets, Legos) that otherwise might be less evident if one’s sib is another female. 
We are not advancing either of these claims; we merely invoke them as evidence of the 
ambiguity of some of the key findings supporting the organizational role of hormones in 
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developmental outcomes. 
In any event, a hormonally-induced sex difference in preferences that is functionally 
independent of actual ability jibes with Ceci et al.’s assertion that female choice (e.g., to enter the 
humanities rather than science fields, to prioritize family over a career in science, or to enter a 
non-mathematical scientific instead of a math-intensive field) is likely much more important than 
biological differences in ability when explaining female underrepresentation in mathematically-
intensive fields. This helps explain why, despite a 2-to-1 ratio of males to females scoring among 
the top 1% of the mathematics distribution, there is nowhere close to one-third women 
occupying math-intensive positions in fields such as physics, engineering, computer science, 
economics, chemistry, and mathematics. Clearly, more than high levels of math aptitude are at 
play in sorting men and women into careers. 
3.6 Discussion 
  In this paper we have attempted to synthesize findings across many areas of research 
(endocrinology/psychoneuroendocrinology, neuroscience/anatomy, mental rotation, sociology, 
evolutionary psychology, education, personality, and genetics) comprising the long chain of 
logic underlying the use of the 2D/4D ratio to make claims about sex differences in brain 
organization. Such a synthesis is both important and timely, as the comparative ease and non-
invasiveness with which 2D/4D can be measured has made it an increasingly central piece of 
evidence in the biologically-based cognitive sex differences and the Brain Organization 
Hypothesis. Yet the ease of 2D/4D measurement has revealed its weakness, and it is now readily 
used to support inconsistent conclusions about sex differences in brain organization without a 
full understanding of how tenuous the evidence supporting its validity actually is.  Indeed, in 
carrying out this review we have identified numerous inconsistencies and have raised alternative 
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interpretations of the 2D/4D ratio studies that, taken together, temper claims related to early 
brain organizational theory. Although nothing in this review refutes this theory, far stronger 
support for it is needed if it is to account for the dearth of women in mathematical fields. In the 
remainder of this paper we identify specific areas and methodological issues in need of 
resolution, based on our review of the literature. (A summary of the reviewed studies can be 
found in Table 7).  
3.6.1 Sample Representativeness 
As noted in several places, some studies attempting to delineate high- and low digit ratios 
within-sex did so with unrepresentative samples.  If the seemingly contradictory spatial 
advantage for high digit ratio (i.e. more feminized) males is actually an artifact of using a male 
sample that has a below-average ratio to begin with, then the ideal ratio may in this hypothetical 
example be the male average.  Such potential confounds only confuse interpretations and claims 
(e.g., the super-male brain supposedly being more androgenized) and underscore the need for 
better sampling. More broadly, the issue of sample representativeness looms as a barrier to 
theory validation.  
3.6.2 Reliability and Validity of 2D/4D in General, and as Proxy for Degree of Lateralization 
Although we have reviewed the digit ratio-cognitive sex difference literature under the 
assumption that digit ratio is a valid and reliable proxy for prenatal androgen exposure, such 
assumptions may be premature. That is, there is some evidence that digit ratio is fluid, and 
fluctuates, for instance, with menstrual cycle (Mayhew, Gillam, McDonald, & Ebling, 2007). 
There are also larger within-sex but between-ethnicity 2D/4D differences in digit ratio than there 
are between-sex differences, raising questions about the magnitude of testosterone required to 
affect both physiological and psychological outcomes (Cohen-Bendahan, van de Beek, & 
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Berenbaum, 2005).  
While 2D/4D is an alluringly simple tool for studying the effects of prenatal testosterone 
on development, hence accounting for the hundreds of studies employing it (Voracek & Loibl, 
2009), researchers may have “put the wagon before the horse” in using this methodology.  As 
noted earlier, it seems vastly over-interpreted considering that it is indicative – at best – of 
prenatal testosterone level at one particular gestation period when limb and urogenital functions 
are most affected. Considering that we currently do not yet fully know when cognitive, athletic, 
and behavioral attributes are determined in utero, digit ratio determination may only coincide 
with a fraction of traits determined prenatally. Puts et al. (2008) made a similar point in noting 
the asynchrony of digit growth and mental rotation ability. We currently lack an understanding 
of the gestational windows of these attributes, and thus risk arriving at conclusions about 
cognitive and behavioral developments that at times correlate with digit ratio. More validation is 
needed via longitudinal amniocentesis studies that are later compared with digit ratios and other 
attributes; this will provide a clearer picture of how, when, and what prenatal testosterone 
affects. In this regard, if such studies are conducted it will be important to address criticisms of 
Baron-Cohen’s methodology (e.g., Jordan-Young, 2010). 
3.6.3 Unitary Nature of Spatial and Numerical Abilities, Functionally and Methodologically 
More care should also be taken in selecting appropriate and, if possible, novel tests of 
spatial and numerical abilities. Given findings that mental rotation performance may have less to 
do with the process of rotation than is assumed (Hooven, Chabris, Ellison, & Kosslyn, 2004), 
and the claim that spatial and numerical competencies can be reduced to the unitary dimension of 
spatially-represented magnitude (Bull & Benson, 2006), there may be more incisive method than 
those currently used to investigate exactly where any cognitive sex differences exist. If spatial 
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and numerical abilities (and, within spatial abilities, 2-D and 3-D mental rotation) are not as 
unitary as Bull and Benson assert, then using a wide array of different tests is necessary in future 
investigations, so that interpretations do not rest upon islets of ability. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In sum, as with the broader debate about Brain Organization Theory, the 2D/4D-
spatial/numerical ability relationship is complicated. Evidence has been provided for three 
alternative possibilities to the currently assumed relationship, all of which can be reasonably 
inferred from the extant 2D/4D-cognitive sex difference literature. First is a quadratic, inverse-U 
relationship, purported by studies such as Brosnan (2006). Unfortunately, contradictory evidence 
exists not only between studies but even within studies such as Brosnan’s, as discussed above.  
Second is the possibility of sexually-differentiated prenatal brain organization pathways 
and timescales, which may manifest in sex-dependent relationships between, for instance, digit 
ratio and spatial/numerical ability (e.g., Valla et al., 2010). To date, research has been limited to 
addressing the existence of this relationship, based on the questionable assumption that there are 
no sex differences in these prenatal developments and brain organization pathways; alternative 
hypotheses including different developmental trajectories for males and females should be 
entertained.  
Third is a possible relationship between prenatal hormone exposure and preferences, 
rather than ability. Future studies should attempt to differentiate between biologically-influenced 
interest, and biologically-influenced ability, which may be dissociable. Separating the effects of 
interests and abilities may help determine what, if any, inherent sex differences in spatial and 
numerical ability actually exist, and may be a promising area of reconciliation between the 
nature and nurture sides of this debate. 
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Support for early brain organization theory will require closer interleaving of 
correlational and experimental evidence. Most of the support for this theory has come from 
studies that were designed in response to a handful of prior studies – which is how good science 
accumulates.  However, in the case of early brain organization theory, studies are needed that 
respond to the topography of the theory rather than to one of its high-relief landmarks. Future 
research will need to be framed in terms of the larger theory instead of local hypotheses. Such an 
approach will protect against short-sightedness that sometimes characterizes this literature.   
3.8 Relevance to Work Three 
 As discussed in the first work, autism is in many ways a “natural experiment” in 
cognitive and social variation, an extreme version of the hypothesized inverse relationship 
between systemizing and empathizing skills, as well as an example of the cognitive and social 
effects of extreme levels of prenatal androgen exposure. Whereas the two works presented so far 
have concerned normative variation and co-variation in empathizing and systemizing, and their 
neurobiological underpinnings, the third work re-contextualizes these aspects of the E-S Co-
variance Hypothesis as normative extensions of longstanding ideas in autism research.  
Specifically, the so-called “Kanner Hypothesis” of autism holds that seemingly unrelated 
autistic social and non-social traits – some of which can be characterized as high systemizing or 
low empathizing – share a common underlying cause. The importance of the first two works with 
regards to the Kanner Hypothesis, then, lies in the ideas that 1) E-S Co-variance is greater in 
males than in females; and 2) Sex-dependent E-S Co-variance has prenatal neurobiological 
origins, but these prenatal effects may have their greatest influence indirectly, through initiating 
sexually dimorphic developmental trajectories. Together these ideas suggest that E-S Co-
variance increases with greater prenatal androgen exposure, but also that much of E-S Co-
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variance arises as a function of development. 
 The third work takes the evidence of E-S Co-variance from typical populations discussed 
in the preceding works and brings it together with evidence of E-S Co-variance from autistic 
symptom factor structures found in clinical investigations. The Interactive Specialization model 
of neurological and behavioral development that results bridges the gap between E-S Co-
variance patterns found in typical and autistic populations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CO-VARIATION OF SOCIAL AND NON-SOCIAL ‘AUTISTIC’ TRAITS, IN AUTISTIC 
AND TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 
4.1 Introduction 
Current consensus holds that autism represents the extreme of a spectrum subsuming 
certain cognitive, social, and behavioral characteristics. These characteristics are categorized 
behaviorally in terms of the diagnostic “triad” of social interaction deficits, communicative 
deficits, and restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994).  They are described theoretically in terms of (1) deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) or 
understanding intentionality (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and in 
future-oriented cognitive flexibility, or executive functioning (EF) (Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1991); and also (2) a bias toward local over global information processing, or weak 
central coherence (WCC) (Frith & Happé, 1994). In the terms of normative psychology, these 
two groups of traits are equivalent to Trope's notions of decreased “psychological distance” and 
low “level of construal,” respectively (see Trope & Liberman, 2010). Less extreme positions 
along the autism spectrum are occupied by Asperger syndrome (AS), pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), and the more subtle, sub-clinical idiosyncrasies of 
many first-degree relatives of individuals with autism, the sort described by Kanner in his 
seminal work (1943). This latter, broader autism phenotype has been empirically distinguished to 
such a degree that elements of it are sometimes referred to as the proper-noun Broader Autism 
Phenotype, or BAP (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997a; Dawson et al., 2002; Happé et al., 2001; 
Lord, Cook, Leventhal, & Amaral, 2000; Piven, 1999). 
4.1.1 Questioning the “Kanner Hypothesis” 
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Researchers and clinicians have long questioned the assumption that social (e.g., ToM 
deficits) and non-social (e.g., WCC) ASC traits are related, co-varying between individuals in a 
manner implying a shared underlying cause. As theorists have previously pointed out (Mandy & 
Skuse, 2008; Happé & Ronald, 2008), this presumption of social/non-social co-variance in ASC 
individuals dates to Kanner’s original descriptions of autism (Kanner, 1943) that framed autistic 
social and detail-oriented cognitive bias as two sides of the same coin. For instance, in Kanner’s 
initial synthesis of commonalities among his first eleven case studies, the children in question are 
said to share a tendency to “establish and maintain an excellent, purposeful, and ‘intelligent’ 
relation to objects that do not threaten to interfere with their aloneness, but are from the start 
anxiously and tensely impervious to people…,” and “If dealing with another person becomes 
inevitable, then a temporary relationship is formed with the person's hand or foot as a definitely 
detached object, but not with the person himself. All of the children's activities and utterances are 
governed rigidly and consistently by the powerful desire for aloneness and sameness.”  Since 
that time, the ‘Kanner hypothesis’ - that, in Kanner’s parlance, a preference for “aloneness” is 
the flipside of a related need for “sameness” - has persisted as one of the most hotly debated 
questions in autism research, being directly relevant to whether there is in any sense a single 
cause or, if sameness and aloneness are not related, causes, underlying the condition. This 
question of the unity of social aloneness and perceptual sameness was the implicit basis of the 
debate between ToM and WCC accounts of autism, as WCC proponents held that the ToM 
account did not adequately explain the non-social, perceptual aspects of ASC (Frith & Happé, 
1994). 
Kanner’s definition of autism was, however, based on observations of patients presenting 
with both social and non-social symptoms to begin with, to the selective exclusion of cases 
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where social or non-social deficits were absent. Assessing the validity of theories of autism 
according to how well they account for social and non-social symptoms simultaneously is thus 
ultimately an exercise in circular logic, as Kanner’s observations were based on patients within 
whom, by clinical diagnostic definition, social and non-social deficits are comorbid (Happé & 
Ronald, 2008; Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006). As such, there is not necessarily reason to 
assume, as Kanner might, that severe social interaction deficits come part and parcel with 
extremity in repetitive behaviors and/or restricted interests. Similar criticisms of circular logic 
have been levied against studies (e.g., Van Lang et al., 2006; Boomsma et al., 2008) basing 
Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) factor analyses solely on items tapping the DSM-
IV diagnostic triad (Kamp-Becker, Ghahreman, Smidt, & Remschmidt, 2009). (For a historical 
review of the repeated re-emergence of Kanner’s assumptions in autism research and theory, see 
Happé & Ronald, 2008). 
4.1.2 The Kanner Hypothesis in the Normative Population 
A separate line of research has extended the autism spectrum into and throughout the 
normative population, such that social and non-social autistic traits are normally distributed 
across all individuals, with social deficits and cognitive idiosyncrasies taking subclinical forms. 
On these dimensional axes, clinically diagnosable autism differs from normative functioning 
quantitatively and by degree, rather than being qualitatively distinct from normative cognitive 
variation. The best known of these descriptions is Empathizing-Systemizing (E-S) theory, which 
holds that ASC is an extreme version of the human brain in terms of its neuroarchitectural “male-
ness,” the prototypical “male brain” being organized for superior “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 
2002; Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997b), or processes of observation-based rule-making reducing 
the world to a series of “lawful, finite, and deterministic” rules. The prototypical “female brain,” 
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by contrast, is better organized for “empathizing,” the ability to accurately attribute and 
affectively respond to others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen, 2002).  
The full range of these attributes, from high- to low empathizing and high- to low 
systemizing, constitutes the entire E-S spectrum, within which the general population is normally 
distributed (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997b). One’s position on this continuum is thought to be 
determined partly by levels of prenatal testosterone exposure (Baron-Cohen, Lutchmaya, & 
Knickmeyer, 2004), with higher levels of prenatal exposure producing a more lateralized, 
systemizing-oriented, “male” brain (Witelson & Nowakowski, 1991; Geschwind & Galaburda, 
1987), gestational overexposure to testosterone being only one amongst many interacting factors 
that can bias brain and cognitive development towards an autistic outcome.  Supporting this 
assertion is evidence of higher testosterone levels in amniocenteses of individuals presenting 
with autism-like empathizing difficulties and systemizing prowess later in development (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2004), and lower than average second-to-fourth digit length ratios (a biomarker 
proxy measure of prenatal testosterone exposure) among ASC individuals and their first degree 
relatives, individuals falling into the BAP category, and individuals with systemizing prowess 
and sub-clinical empathizing difficulties (see Valla & Ceci, 2011 for a full review). 
As E-S theory was built upon – or, one might even say, built to account for – the 
assumptions of social and non-social co-variance in clinical populations that began with Kanner, 
it is worth questioning the Kanner hypothesis not only in the context of clinical presentation, but 
in typical development, too (Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Valla et al., 2010).  If the E-S factor space 
comprises a single axis with high empathizing and low systemizing at one end and low 
empathizing and high systemizing at the other, as initially described (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 
1997b), then systemizing ability should carry with it tradeoffs in empathizing, and vice versa.  
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Such would be, in effect, a normative-variation extension of the Kanner hypothesis. An 
alternative model, implicit in subsequent work (Baron-Cohen, 2002), presents the E-S factor 
space as bidimensional, wherein empathizing and systemizing vary independently, an autistic, 
extreme male brain arising from concurrently low empathizing and high systemizing abilities, an 
extreme female brain arising from the opposite pattern.  This alternative, two-dimensional model 
of the E-S factor space implies no tradeoffs between systemizing and empathizing. 
The importance of E-S co-variance in understanding normative cognition cannot be 
understated.  For one, an inverse E-S co-variance pattern in the normative population (i.e. the 
single-axis E-S model) would mean that mathematical and spatial skills or deficits would be 
predictive of such seemingly unrelated social deficits or skills as understanding intentionality.  In 
lay terms, testing for this type of E-S co-variance in the normative population means questioning 
the stereotype of spatial and/or mathematical prowess going hand-in-hand with social ineptitude. 
Insofar as any normative E-S co-variance patterns may hold also at the clinical extremity, 
evidence for or against E-S co-variance in the normative population would also be essential to 
consider alongside evidence for or against the Kanner hypothesis in clinical presentation. More 
to the point, E-S independence in typically developing individuals would bring into question 
theories attempting to account for ASC with a single-cause explanation, and the broader idea of 
ASC arising from coincidence of partially independent but synergistic factors might begin to 
seem more likely (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006).  Thus, whilst understanding E-S co-
variance patterns can tell us important things about normative functioning, it can also inform us 
on the causes underlying ASC. 
Whilst the Kanner debate is framed here as one of evidence for or against E-S co-
variance and the Kanner hypothesis, the distinction between co-variance on the one hand and 
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independence between autism's social and non-social symptom domains on the other need not be 
binary: social and non-social symptoms may be partially dependent, synergizing and reinforcing 
each other to some extent, but varying independently enough to give rise to a multitude of 
individual phenotypes. This independence may be particularly pronounced in cases or 
populations where levels of autistic traits are subtle and where, therefore, mutually reinforcing 
interactions amongst these symptom domains are weak.  Thus independence of autism's various 
social and non-social symptom domains may be strongest not within but beyond the autism 
spectrum, in individuals with the Broader Autism Phenotype (Piven, 1999) and in the subtle 
levels of autistic traits that occur throughout the general population, and – to apply Baron-
Cohen's terms – may be stronger in “female brain” individuals rather than the “male brain” 
which, according to Baron-Cohen, autism more closely approaches (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004).  
Evidence regarding E-S co-variance in normative samples is in this way at least as important as 
clinical sample data in assessing the veracity of the Kanner hypothesis. 
Lastly, the use of an E-S theory framework is not meant to imply that E-S theory, its 
constructs, or its predictions are undisputed. On the contrary, a substantial portion of the data 
reviewed below brings into question central assumptions of E-S theory. In fact, challenging E-S 
theory is in a sense the purpose of this review, though the interest here lies more narrowly in 
challenging the Kanner assumption of co-variance between the “E” and the “S,” rather than 
evaluating E-S theory in general.  The assumption of Kanner co-variance extends well beyond E-
S theory, and the underlying questions are the same whether the discussion is framed in terms of 
‘Empathizing’ versus ‘Systemizing’, or iconic, detail-oriented, egocentric perception, cognition 
and action versus symbolic, contextualized, allocentric perception, cognition and action. The 
present discussion is framed in E-S terms because E-S theory seems the most fully articulated 
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example of Kanner co-variance assumptions, within and beyond the spectrum, in contemporary 
autism theory and research.  Indeed, the present review is not the first to recognize the utility of 
an E-S framework in this context (Mandy & Skuse, 2008). 
The use of E-S terminology nonetheless necessitates two key qualifications. First, the 
terms ‘male brain’ and ‘female brain’ are perhaps unfortunate in that a complete identification of 
brain type with sex and/or gender can mislead; the initial elaboration of E-S theory came with the 
caveat that many females would be classified as having male-type brains, and many males as 
having female-type brains (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). Second, in terms of the idea of 
empathizing ‘deficits’ in autism, the term ‘empathizing’ in this case refers specifically to 
cognitive empathy, rather than affective empathy; the difference between the two is the 
difference between explicit perspective taking and emotional contagion. 
4.1.3 Relevant Population Characteristics and Evidence for Assessing the Kanner Hypothesis  
The normal distribution of autistic traits throughout the clinical and non-clinical 
population (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997b) necessitates that factor structures and co-variance 
patterns in clinical, subclinical, and non-clinical samples be considered alongside one another.  
The developmental nature of autism necessitates inclusion of evidence from across age groups, 
as social/non-social co-variance patterns present early in development (i.e. close to the prenatal 
period) may differ greatly from patterns emerging later, after any comorbid social and non-social 
traits repeatedly interact behaviorally and cognitively. 
Measures most directly relevant to assessing the Kanner hypothesis are trait inventories, 
and cognitive and social psychometrics. Trait inventories include clinically-oriented symptom 
inventories (e.g., Autism Diagnostic Inventory - Revised, or ADI-R); behavioral inventories 
applicable to clinical, subclinical, and non-clinical populations (e.g., Social Responsiveness 
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Scale, or SRS); and self-reported assessments of sub-clinical manifestations of autistic 
symptoms, in the form of personality traits, behaviors, preferences, and tendencies used mainly 
with sub-clinical and normative populations [e.g., Autism Spectrum Quotient, or AQ (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001); the Systemizing Quotient, or SQ (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, 
Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003); and the Empathizing Quotient, or EQ (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004)]. Interpretations of ASC trait structure based on the AQ, EQ, and SQ come 
with the caveat that these measures do not capture all ASC traits, being based on the higher 
functioning end of the autism spectrum (e.g., Asperger Syndrome, BAP). The AQ, for instance, 
contains few high functioning analogues of the sensory abnormalities and motor stereotypies 
seen in clinical cases (Valla et al., 2010). 
Relevant cognitive measures include those roughly categorized along systemizing and 
empathizing lines.  In the systemizing category are assessments of spatial skills and pattern 
recognition (e.g., Block Design and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children, or WISC-III) and other measures favoring cognitive inflexibilities and detail-
oriented biases, such as disembedding speed on the Embedded Figures Test (EFT; Witkin, 1950), 
and susceptibility to visual illusions (e.g., Walter, Dassonville, & Bochler, 2008).  In the 
empathizing category are assessments of facial mental state/emotion reading (Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Test, or RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), face 
recognition (e.g., Benton face recognition test; Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983), and 
ToM (e.g., false belief test; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Relevant analytic methods can be roughly separated into two complementary approaches: 
factor analyses of the underlying trait structure of social and non-social ASC-related traits within 
individuals, and correlational analyses assessing co-variance of these traits between individuals. 
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The latter approach allows social/non-social relationships to be tested more directly than do 
factor analyses, wherein social/non-social relationships are inferred from factor loadings.  Factor 
analytic methods used in the studies reviewed below can be further divided into exploratory 
(EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) subtypes.  CFA is a top-down, theory driven, model-fitting 
method that tests the accuracy of imposed factor structures, in terms of their ability to account 
for individual variation in a given behavioral inventory.  EFA, meanwhile, exposes relationships 
between ASC traits in a data-driven, bottom-up manner which complements correlational studies 
and CFAs by making no presuppositions about factor structure. Factor analytic studies in the 
literature use EFA, CFA and, in some cases, EFA validated by CFA using a second, independent 
sample. 
4.2 Review of Evidence for and Against the Kanner Hypothesis  
A review of the literature finds significant evidence against the Kanner hypothesis, 
though the evidence in favor is not insubstantial. Three interrelated themes emerge, which 
together reconcile these two seemingly opposing sets of evidence for and against the Kanner 
hypothesis, suggesting a model in which initially independent social and non-social traits interact 
during developmental of behavior and cognition, giving rise to emergent Kanner-like co-variance 
in behavioral presentation. 
The three themes are as such: First, evidence suggests an alternative triad of primary, 
independent ASC factors – Social Interaction Deficits, Cognitive Inflexibility, and Sensory 
Abnormalities - which may more accurately reflect the underlying structure of autistic traits than 
the currently applied diagnostic triad.  The proposed alternative triad better accounts for 
heterogeneities within two domains of the diagnostic triad – Communicative Deficits and 
Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests – heterogeneities that can produce spurious 
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appearances of Kanner-like social/non-social co-variance in some studies.  Second, these three 
alternative-triad factors may be independently heritable, implying multi-factor causation at the 
biological level.  Third, despite this biologically based independence which may seem to negate 
the Kanner assumption, Kanner-like social/non-social co-variance in behavioral presentation 
within individuals can arise and amplify during postnatal development.  Three additional patterns 
in the data support this model: increased Kanner-like co-variance with increases in trait 
extremity in multiple domains; greater Kanner-like co-variance in males compared to females; 
and continuity in this pattern of increasing behavioral co-variance across non-clinical, 
subclinical, and clinical populations. 
In the dialectic that follows, we begin by reviewing the evidence in terms of broad 
categories of findings for and against the Kanner hypothesis.  The reviewed evidence is then 
synthesized, first into the three aforementioned themes, then into an overarching developmental 
model accounting for these themes.  The explanatory power of the hypothesized developmental 
model then is demonstrated, first by extrapolating to an in-depth, novel account of autistic 
behavioral stereotypies; and second, in a more brief and speculative fashion, with potential 
developmental accounts of other traits – such as musical savantism and communicative deficits – 
that have tended in the past to encourage single-cause accounts of autism. 
4.2.1 Evidence Against the Kanner Hypothesis 
How does translation from the diagnostic triad to the proposed alternative triad transform 
evidence appearing to support the Kanner hypothesis into evidence against Kanner-like 
social/non-social co-variance?   
Empirically, the Communicative Deficits factor of the diagnostic triad seems to 
consolidate incorrectly two separable types of deficits: those related to social reciprocation per 
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se, and communicative-domain instances of more domain-general cognitive inflexibilities (e.g., 
verbal stereotypies).  Factor analyses of several trait inventories converge on this fractionation 
between symptoms subsumed under the Communicative Deficits category.  In a principal 
components analysis of the ADI-R (Georgiades et al., 2007), delays in language development 
loaded on a Social Communication factor, whereas repetitive and idiosyncratic speech loaded on 
an Inflexible Language and Behavior factor along with non-communicative, cognitive 
inflexibility-related behaviors (e.g., circumscribed interests, ritualistic behaviors).  Although 
Tadevosyan-Leyfer et al. (2003) found a more granular factor structure comprising Spoken 
Language, Social Intent, Sensory Aversions, Savant Skills, and Compulsions in their EFA of the 
ADI-R, inter-factor correlations revealed the Spoken Language factor was more highly related to 
both Social Intent (0.45) and Compulsions (0.33) factors than the other factors were related to 
each other (Table 1), singling out Spoken Language as a partial combination of a social and a 
domain-general factor, and suggesting that the appearance of Spoken Language as a distinct 
factor might have more to do with the structure of the test instrument and the clinical diagnostic 
definition of the syndrome than with the underlying trait structure.  Two additional factor 
analyses of the ADI-R each resulted in two-factor models aligning social reciprocation aspects of 
Communication Deficits with other social deficits, and cognitive inflexibility aspects with a 
Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests factor (Snow, Lecavalier, & Houts, 2009; 
Frazier, Youngstrom, Kubu, Sinclair, & Rezai, 2008).  These analyses were notable in terms of 
their large sample sizes (N = 1861, N = 1170, respectively). 
Even though a factor analysis of the CARS revealed a distinct Social Communication 
factor, as was the case with the aforementioned ADI-R analysis this factor was highly correlated 
with both Social Interaction (0.529) and the non-social Stereotypies and Sensory Abnormalities 
  76 
(0.415) factors (Magyer & Pandolfi, 2009).  Similarly, among Child Asperger Syndrome Test 
(CAST) diagnostic triad subscores, Communication Deficits correlated more highly with Social 
Interaction Deficits and with Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests (0.39, 0.42, 
respectively, in males; 0.26, 0.34 in females) both, than Social Interaction Deficits were 
correlated with Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests (0.27 in males, 0.17 in females) 
(Ronald et al., 2006b).  Such correlational differences would be expected from the mixture of 
social-communicative and cognitive-inflexibility symptoms lumped into the Communication 
Deficits factor of the current diagnostic triad. 
In two independent factor analyses of items comprising the Restricted and Repetitive 
Behaviors and Interests subscale of the ADI-R, an Insistence on Sameness component was 
significantly correlated with the Communication Deficits domain subscore of the ADI-R, but not 
the Social Interaction Deficits domain subscore (Szatmari et al., 2006; Lam et al., 2008).  
Another ADI-R analysis (Van Lang et al., 2006; cross-culturally validated in Boomsma et al., 
2008) found that a triad of Impaired Social Communication, Stereotyped Features in Behavior 
and Communication, and Impaired Play Skills outperformed both the DSM-IV triad and a single-
factor model.  Although the third factor of our hypothesized triad is Sensory Abnormalities 
where in this investigation it was Impaired Play Skills (e.g., difficulties with social play and 
forming peer relationships), the Communicative Deficits factor in both cases is split between 
social reciprocity difficulties and cognitive inflexibility. 
A retrospective-versus-current presentation longitudinal analysis of child ADI-R scores 
found that both verbal and non-verbal repetitive behaviors fractionated into two distinct factors 
depending on level of complexity: stereotyped utterances and echolalia loaded on a Stereotypies 
factor along with motor stereotypies, whereas verbal rituals and neologisms loaded on a domain-
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general cognitive inflexibility factor Anxiety and Compulsions along with restricted interests. 
Communicative reciprocity (i.e. give-and-take conversational skills), on the other hand, loaded 
on a Social-Communication factor (Kamp-Becker, Ghahreman, Smidt, & Remschmidt, 2009).  
On ADOS-G inventories of current (6-24y) symptom presentation, similar loadings mirrored the 
same distinctions between deficits of social reciprocation, and cognitive inflexibility: language 
ability loaded negatively on an Interests and Compulsions factor, and speech abnormalities and 
stereotyped behaviors loaded on a Non/Verbal Behavior factor, whereas conversational 
communication skills loaded on a Social-Communication factor. This combination of results at 
different ages indicates some developmental continuity of heterogeneity in Communicative 
Deficit domain symptoms. 
 Matson and colleagues’ (2010) factor analysis of Baby and Infant Screen for Children 
with Autism Traits (BISCUIT)-Part 1, an inventory for ~1-3y infants and children, reveals an 
even more telling developmental picture. Although an EFA revealed a three-factor solution 
similar to the diagnostic triad, the vast majority of items loaded on Socialization/Non-verbal 
Communication and Repetitive Behavior/Restricted Interests factors, with multiple reciprocation-
related communicative behaviors loading on the former factor, and inflexibility-related 
communicative deficits loading on the latter factor. This fractionation further supports 
heterogeneity among Communicative Deficit behaviors, but also highlights the utility of a 
developmental lens in understanding how and when a heterogeneous Communicative Deficit 
factor emerges. 
Cognitive inflexibilities subsumed under the Communicative Deficits diagnostic domain 
may be fed by deeper roots.  Repetitive verbal behaviors (e.g., verbal rituals) and verbal 
behaviors unrelated to cognitive flexibility (e.g., presence of phrase speech) both are less 
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variable within versus between affected sibships, whereas no such significant sibship effect 
exists for Communicative Deficits domain scores amalgamating flexibility-related and unrelated 
communicative skills (Silverman et al., 2002).  This statistical dissociation has been interpreted 
as implying that these two types of “communicative” (or at least verbal) symptoms arise from 
independent genetic origins (Silverman et al., 2002).  In a factor analysis of a new symptom 
inventory assessing autism-relevant endophenotypes, verbal stereotypies (e.g., echolalia) loaded 
on a Stereotypic Behavior factor along with non-verbal, motor stereotypies (Sacco et al., 2010). 
The same study's loading of “age at first social smile” on the cognitive inflexibility-related 
Stereotypic Behavior factor seems, though, to violate a factorization of social reciprocity versus 
cognitive flexibility-related communicative deficits; this relationship is, one could argue, the 
Kanner hypothesis in its most basic form. This seemingly contradictory finding is re-interpreted 
in more detail below. 
Assuming factorial continuity between clinical and non-clinical populations, further 
support for heterogeneity within the Communicative Deficits domain comes from studies on 
typically developing populations using the AQ (Austin, 2005):  Of the “Big Five” personality 
traits (Openness to new experience; Conscientiousness; Extraversion; Agreeableness; and 
Neuroticism, well-established  dimensions of personality), AQ Communication subscores are 
significantly positively correlated with Neuroticism, and negatively correlated with Extraversion, 
Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness.  Meanwhile, AQ Social Skills subscores are 
related (negatively) only to Extraversion and Agreeableness, and AQ Attention to Detail 
subscores are related (negatively) only to Openness and Conscientiousness.  AQ Communication 
subscores, in other words, describe personality constructs ostensibly related to cognitive 
(in)flexibility (Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Openness) as well as traits related to 
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willingness to engage in social interaction (Extraversion and Agreeableness).  AQ Social Skills 
and Attention to Detail subscores, meanwhile, do not overlap in their Big Five trait loadings, yet 
both overlap with AQ Communication subscores (Austin, 2005).  Even though this same study 
identified a three-factor model of the AQ with a Communication subscale distinct from Social 
Skills and Details and Patterns (as the diagnostic triad would predict), a pattern like that of the 
five-factor model arose when these three subscales were correlated against Big Five traits. 
A replication of the same three-factor extraction revealed that whilst items loading on the 
first component were from the AQ Social Skills subscale, and items loading on the second 
component from the Details and Patterns subscale, the third component included item loadings 
from both the AQ Communication subscale and the AQ Social Skills and Details and Patterns 
subscales (Hurst et al., 2007).  These patterns together support the idea that the Communicative 
Deficits symptom domain is an amalgam of social and non-social traits of distinct cognitive (and, 
perhaps, biological) origins.  Finally, in each of the AQ-based factor analytic studies in which 
inter-factor correlation patterns were provided (Kloosterman et al., 2011; Stewart & Austin, 
2009; Austin, 2009; Table 1), there were significant correlations between social interaction-
related factors and communication factors, and between communication factors and inflexibility 
factors, but no such relationships between social interaction and inflexibility factors. 
Evidence also supports the idea that the Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests 
factor of the diagnostic triad, like the Communication Deficits factor, conflates traits rooted in 
Cognitive Inflexibility (e.g., restricted interests) and those rooted in lower-level Sensory 
Abnormalities (e.g., auditory, tactile and visual hypersensitivities).  Aforementioned ADI-R-
based factor analyses focusing specifically on Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests 
diagnostic items all resulted in fairly clean splits between traits and behaviors concerning 
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cognitive inflexibility, and those concerning lower-level sensory issues (Szatmari et al., 2006; 
Papageorgiou et al., 2008; Lam, Bodfish, & Piven, 2008). 
Two additional ADI-R factor analyses within the Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and 
Interests element of the diagnostic triad likewise found separable factors of Repetitive Sensory 
Motor Actions and Resistance to Change in one case, and Repetitive Sensorimotor and Insistence 
on Sameness in the other (Cuccaro et al., 2004, and Richler, Bishop, Kleinke, & Lord, 2007, 
respectively).  In a previously mentioned ADI-R analysis, three components - Repetitive Motor 
Behaviors, Insistence on Sameness, and Circumscribed Interests - were extracted from items 
subsumed under the Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests domain (Lam, Bodfish, & 
Piven, 2008).  Even though Circumscribed Interests was identified as its own component, 
individual items pertaining to Circumscribed Interests were the only items loading on both 
Repetitive Motor Behaviors and cognitive flexibility-related Insistence on Sameness factors.  
Items loading on Repetitive Motor Behaviors and Insistence on Sameness, in other words, were 
distinct in their loadings. And the aforementioned ADI-R factor analysis by Tadevosyan-Leyfer 
et al. (2003) found distinct factors for inflexibility-based Savant Skills and Sensory Aversions, 
with a virtually nonexistent inter-factor correlation (Table 1).  On the other hand, the 
Compulsions factor which, according to the current hypothesis, should have been be a 
heterogeneous mixture of inflexibility and sensory abnormalities, constituted an independent 
factor, with extremely low inter-factor correlations between these three factors.  Finally, loadings 
from a factor analysis of the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) distinguished between 
items concerning fear, nervousness, and adaptation to change (i.e. reactions to novel situations 
reflecting cognitive flexibility) and those regarding sensory and motor issues related to taste, 
touch, smell, body use, and stereotypies (i.e. Sensory Abnormalities) (Magyer & Pandolfi, 2007).  
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The factor analyses of retrospective ADI-R and current ADOS-G inventories described 
above (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009) lend longitudinal support to the hypothesized heterogeneity of 
symptoms subsumed under the Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests domain 
(insofar as retrospective ASC trait inventories reliably reflect past trait presentation).   
Retrospective ADI-R items load onto 4 factors: Social Communication, Anxiety and 
Compulsions, Stereotyped Behavior, and Inadequate Behaviors; current presentation (ADOS-G) 
items loaded onto 5 partially coincident factors: Social Communication, Non/Verbal Behavior, 
Hyperactivity, Stereotyped Behavior, and Circumscribed Interests/Compulsions. Importantly, 
ADI-R items concerning circumscribed interests load on the Anxiety and Compulsions factor.  A 
subset of the Cognitive Inflexibility/Insistence on Sameness factors in aforementioned studies 
distinguishes these interests from low-level sensory abnormalities; and the ADOS-G factor 
Circumscribed Interests/Compulsions maintains this separability from sensory abnormalities at 
current presentation.  In the diagnostic triad, then, just as social reciprocity is distinct from 
cognitive flexibility within Communicative Deficits, sensory abnormalities are distinct from 
cognitive flexibility within Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests.  These 
social/cognitive and sensory/cognitive distinctions pertain across retrospective (ADI-R) and 
current (ADOS-G) behavioral inventories. 
Implicit in the distinction between Sensory Abnormalities and Cognitive Inflexibilities is 
the idea that abnormalities in sensory modulation are a primary, core feature of ASC, rather than 
secondary and largely peripheral to core ASC traits.  As Rogers and Ozonoff (2005) point out, 
sensory issues have historically received only peripheral attention in explanatory accounts of 
autism, often subsumed under broader accounts such as executive functioning deficits and WCC.  
The reconceptualization of sensory modulation issues as primary to ASC is gaining traction in 
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the literature, however.  Indeed, the most thorough meta-analysis to date found that sensory 
modulation issues consistently distinguish ASC and TD individuals across studies (Ben-Sasson 
et al., 2009).  Sensory issues are largely separable not only from cognitive inflexibility (as argued 
above), but also from executive functioning (Boyd et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009), and social 
interaction deficits (Watson et al., 2011), the latter observable as early as infancy (Baranek, 
1999).  Moreover, although the affected modalities can vary greatly between ASC individuals 
(perhaps explaining some of the ambivalence towards including sensory issues as a core 
symptom) there is some evidence that, within ASC individuals, extremity of sensory modulation 
abnormalities highly correlates between modalities (Kern et al., 2007). 
Beyond the implications for specific diagnostic domain heterogeneities and the 
hypothesized alternative triad, the above analyses indicate more generally that social and non-
social ASC traits are somewhat independent within individuals, contrary to the Kanner 
hypothesis.  Social/non-social independence also arose in the form of factors Social Affect and 
Restricted, Repetitive Behaviors in a factor analysis of the ADOS, later replicated in an 
independent sample (Gotham et al., 2007; 2008).  Such social/non-social separability was also 
the consensus among reviewed factor analyses of the AQ in more typically developing (i.e. sub- 
and non-clinical) individuals, with different analyses variously revealing: a) a diagnostic triad-
like, three-factor model of Social Deficits, Communication Deficits, and (preference for) Details 
and Patterns (Austin, 2005, replicated in Hurst et al., 2007); b) a factor structure mirroring the 
five subscales originally intended by Baron-Cohen et al. during construction and validation of 
the AQ (Social Skills, Communication, Restricted/Repetitive Behaviors, Imagination, and 
Attention to Detail (Kloosterman, Keefer, Kelley, Summerfeldt, & Parker, 2011); and c) a four-
factor model in-between these two, including Imagination but without Restricted/Repetitive 
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Behaviors (Stewart & Austin, 2009).  Reconciling these discrepancies is a hierarchical factor 
structure with superordinate factors of Social Interaction and Attention to Detail, the former 
comprising four subfactors: Social Skills, Attention Switching, Communication, and Imagination 
(Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008).  The same hierarchical factor structure was 
replicated in another analysis (Valla et al., 2010); when analyzed separately by sex, the 
superordinate split between social and non-social traits was particularly strong in males, 
compared to females.  In all these analyses, social factors were distinct from non-social factors.  
 Similar social/non-social separability has also arisen in other E-S correlations in typically 
developing individuals. For instance, resistance to visual contextual illusions (framed as an 
epiphenomenon of autism-like, detail-oriented processing biases) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ) 
scores have been shown to be independent of Empathizing Quotient (EQ) scores (Walter, 
Dassonville, & Bochler, 2008), while RMET scores are in one study of adults unrelated to EFT 
disembedding speed, performance on a block design test, and SQ score (Carroll & Chiew, 2006).  
Additional studies of empathizing-systemizing co-variance (discussed in further detail below) 
have found sex-dependent patterns wherein social and non-social ASC traits are more 
independent either in males compared to females (Voracek & Dressler, 2006), or females 
compared to males (Valla et al., 2010). 
4.2.2 Evidence For the Kanner Hypothesis 
Although the body of evidence countering the Kanner hypothesis is substantial, evidence 
supporting Kanner-like co-variance is not insignificant.  Two analyses support a single factor 
model of ASC traits.  Constantino and colleagues (2004) found principal components analyses of 
SRS and ADI-R inventories of PDD and non-PDD psychiatric cases supported a single 
underlying component accounting for a large proportion of individual variation in social and 
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non-social ASC traits (35% of variation in SRS scores, 40% in ADI-R scores).  Although 
Szatmari et al. (2006) found a two-factor solution accounting for a majority of the variance (68% 
in a sample of 5y+ cases, 70% in a sample of 4-6y cases) in ADI-R scores, the first of these 
factors comprised severity of traits on all three subscales, with the second factor accounting for 
variance in overall level of functioning. Sample sizes for both studies were, however, notably 
smaller (N = 226, and N = 129, respectively) than most ADI-R factor analyses in the literature. 
In some cases, Kanner-like co-variance has arisen alongside evidence against the Kanner 
hypothesis. In one of the ADI-R factor analyses aforementioned, two of three components 
extracted from Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests - Repetitive Motor Behaviors 
and Insistence on Sameness - correlated significantly and positively with social interaction 
deficits (Lam, Bodfish, & Piven, 2008). In the aforementioned endophenotypic analysis (Sacco 
et al., 2010), lower-level sensory abnormalities (e.g., decreased pain sensitivity) loaded primarily 
on the first of four factors (Circadian and Sensory Dysfunction) while more cognitively based 
repetitive behaviors and circumscribed interests (e.g., verbal stereotypies) loaded on the fourth 
factor (Stereotypic Behavior).  This separability of high- and low-level repetitive behaviors 
reinforces the distinction between Cognitive Inflexibility and Sensory Abnormalities in the 
hypothesized alternative triad.  There is also decreased variability within versus between 
monozygotic twin sibships in social and communicative deficits, and restricted interests, but not 
sensory issues (Kolevzon et al., 2004).  Although this absence of detectable heritable co-
variation does not support sensory symptoms' representing a primary factor in ASC, it does 
support the separability of Sensory Abnormalities from Cognitive Inflexibility. 
In the twin studies that teased apart genetic and phenotypic overlap of the diagnostic 
triad, although each of the triad domains was highly, individually heritable, phenotypic overlap 
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between social and non-social domains was moderate but certainly greater than zero (Ronald et 
al., 2006a).  (From the discussion of an alternative triad it could be argued that phenotypic 
overlap reflects the heterogeneity within diagnostic domains that the alternative triad is meant to 
correct; however, overlap existed even between Social Interaction and Restricted and Repetitive 
Behaviors and Interests, which have no symptoms in common even in the alternative triad.)  
Moreover, such phenotypic overlap increased as severity of social and non-social symptoms 
increased (Ronald et al., 2006b) – meaning that even if slight degrees of autistic traits in the 
typical population may be largely independent, more pronounced degrees of the same traits begin 
to reinforce each other across symptom domains, culminating in the apparent syndrome of 
autism. 
Longitudinal studies support this notion of developmental reinforcement of symptoms 
across domains: although severity in diagnostic triad domains at 2y does not predict severity at 
7y, severity of social and communicative deficits at 3y predicts all three diagnostic domains at 7y 
(Charman et al., 2005).  Additional behavioral evidence for early emergence of social/non-social 
autistic trait co-variance includes replicated findings that RMET scores and visual perceptual 
disembedding speed on the EFT are inversely related in 4-5 year old children (Jarrold et al., 
2000; Pellicano, Maybery, & Durkin, 2005).  The former study found this co-variance pattern in 
children (9y) with ASC diagnoses as well, documenting some spectral continuity in such 
social/non-social co-variance. Later in development, poor ToM skills (measured via first and 
second order false belief tasks) are associated with both decreased susceptibility to visual 
illusions (in which detail-oriented processing gives one the advantage of ignoring visual contexts 
giving rise to such illusions) and increased scores on the Wechsler Block Design subtest, in a 
Kanner-like fashion, in typically developing adolescents and adults with subclinical autistic traits 
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(Best et al., 2008). 
Similar Kanner-like social/non-social co-variance patterns in the normal adult population 
also arises between facial emotion labeling on an early version of the RMET and disembedding 
speed on the EFT (Jarrold et al., 2000).  When re-analyzed separately by sex, however, this 
Kanner-like co-variance remains in women but not men.  At the same time, specific patterns of 
sex-dependent co-variance vary from one study to another, with some finding co-variance in 
females but not males (Jarrold et al., 2000), others males but not females (Valla et al., 2010).  In 
this latter study, men in systemizing-related undergraduate major fields were characterized more 
by empathizing deficits (measured via the RMET, the Benton Face Recognition Test, and the 
Social Interaction hierarchical subscale of the AQ) than by systemizing skills (measured via the 
EFT and the AQ Details/Patterns subscale), whereas no such link between systemizing field and 
face reading difficulties was present in females (Valla et al., 2010).  Heterogeneity in sex-
dependent co-variance findings is not restricted to the question of which sex exhibits the co-
variance, either; it also seems to depend on the specific measures whose co-variation is being 
assayed.  When co-variance is assayed from RMET scores and Systemizing Quotient scores, 
males but not females exhibit not inverse (Kanner-like) but actually positive empathizing-
systemizing co-variance, with RMET scores predicting systemizing tendencies (Voracek & 
Dressler, 2006).   Of these various sex-dependent outcomes, the pattern in Valla et al. (2010) is 
unique in that an independent study provides developmental support for it: Kanner-like co-
variance has been found in school-age boys, but not girls (Skuse et al., 2009), supporting the 
“extreme male brain” notion that males are closer than females to the autism spectrum (Baron-
Cohen, 2002). 
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4.3 Reconciling the Evidence: A Developmental Dynamic Interaction Model 
The mutual exclusivity between social/non-social ASC trait independence and Kanner-
like co-variance, an assumption implicit in many framings of the debate, downplays and 
overlooks the role of development in the progression of symptoms of autism – which is, after all, 
a developmental disorder. In so doing, the assumption overlooks a potential framework for 
reconciling what appear to be opposing sets of evidence. Independently heritable traits of ASC 
(i.e. the factors of the alternative triad) may give rise to Kanner-like co-variance in behavioral 
presentation as they dynamically interact and reinforce each other across development.  It is in 
this developmental construction that non-social capacities can be drafted into the service of 
social cognitive ends, in the way that a positive correlation between figure disembedding ability 
and facial emotion reading has been interpreted as males applying systemizing skills to 
empathizing problems (Valla et al., 2010) (For experimental evidence of such piecemeal face 
processing, in ASC individuals, see Evers, Noens, Steyaert, and Wagemans, 2011). Explicit 
instruction of people with Asperger syndrome in solving empathizing problems using 
systemizing skills has been described as “systemizing empathy” (Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006). 
We argue that this phenomenon – the application of systemizing skills within cognitive 
domains that are more typically, more commonly or more efficiently the bailiwick of 
empathizing skills – need not be the subject of explicit instruction or explicit cognitive strategy, 
and is not restricted to people with autism-spectrum conditions.  We argue, rather, that it happens 
during typical cognitive development as systemizing and empathizing skills supplement – and in 
some instances supplant – each other during interaction with environmental task demands.
 Indeed, reconsidering the reviewed evidence through this developmental lens helps clear 
up some seeming contradictions amongst findings within and between studies.  A prime example 
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of how the hypothesized developmental model would manifest empirically can be found in a 
series of related studies on a single large twin sample (Ronald et al., 2006a, b; Dworzynski et al., 
2007).  First, aforementioned findings demonstrate the non-mutual-exclusivity of the two sides 
of the Kanner hypothesis debate, supporting Kanner-unlike, independent heritabilities of social 
and non-social ASC traits, but also Kanner-like, moderate correlations between domains of 
behavioral presentation (Ronald et al., 2006ab).  Correlations between diagnostic domains of 
Communicative Deficits and both Social Interaction Deficits and Restricted and Repetitive 
Behaviors and Interests can be ascribed partly to the heterogeneity in the communication 
domain, argued above. Such intra-domain heterogeneity within the Communicative Deficits 
domain would give the appearance of deeper inter-domain links than the hypothesized 
possibility: that social interaction deficits are incorrectly paired with cognitive flexibility-related 
linguistic deficits affecting communication.  Heterogeneity within domains cannot account for 
correlations between the distinct diagnostic domains Social Interaction Deficits and Restricted 
and Repetitive Behaviors, however. 
The same data from this large twin sample were also reanalyzed separately within 
subgroups of individuals who presented with extremity (top 5% cutoff) in one, two, and three 
symptom domains. Behavioral overlaps between symptom domains (i.e. intra-domain 
correlations of variation in symptom severity) were significantly greater within the group of 
individuals exhibiting severity in all three domains, compared to groups of individuals exhibiting 
top 5% severity in zero or one domain (Ronald et al., 2006b).  Similar increased overlaps related 
to extremity in multiple domains have been found in other studies (e.g., Skuse et al., 2009; 
Frazier et al., 2008).  According to Baron-Cohen's “extreme male brain” notion this heightened 
correlation at the extreme should be doubly true of males, who are closer to the autism spectrum; 
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and indeed, the same study found greater inter-domain behavioral overlap in males than females. 
Greater Kanner-like co-variance in males compared to females is a common albeit not a 
universal result in studies of autistic traits (Valla et al., 2010). The hypothesized developmental 
model may also support the conjecture that a positive correlation in males between figure 
disembedding and facial emotion labeling (EFT and RMET, respectively) reflects a 
predominantly male cognitive strategy of applying systemizing skills to empathizing problems 
(Valla et al., 2010). 
The present model of developmental interaction between symptom domains is consistent 
with longitudinal observations of the aforementioned twin samples (Ronald et al. 2006ab), 
measured by the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories at 2, 3, and 4 years, and 
the CAST at 8 years.  Early language deficits and later Social Interaction and Communication 
Deficits were related primarily genetically, rather than phenotypically.  Although early language 
deficits were genetically unrelated to later Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests, 
Communication Deficits and Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests domains were 
phenotypically related later in development.  A combination of independent heritability and 
phenotypic dependence arising in concert as they did in these twin samples supports 
developmentally arising Kanner-like co-variance (even after taking into consideration the shared 
cognitive inflexibility component), with later Communicative Deficits representing a 
developmentally emergent interaction between cognitive inflexibility and linguistic elements of 
social behavior. 
This model of Communicative Deficits emerging developmentally as primary social 
reciprocity- and cognitive inflexibility-related factors interact is also reflected in the 
aforementioned BISCUIT-1 factor analysis (Matson et al., 2010).  In the earlier developmental 
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stage represented by this study's sample, the Communicative Deficit factor seems to have begun 
emerging, carrying a small number of inventory items, while many reciprocation-related 
communicative behaviors load on a Socialization/Non-verbal Communication factor, and verbal 
stereotypies load with cognitive inflexibilities and sensory issues on a Repetitive 
Behaviors/Restricted Interests factor.  This study also highlights the idea, distinguishing the 
current model from previous models, that a secondary deficit, though it emerges from more 
primary behavioral interactions, can take on a ‘life of its own’, its presentation becoming 
independent of the primary factors from which it emerges. 
The proposed developmental model helps explain other seeming empirical contradictions. 
The longitudinal finding that communicative deficits are not predictive of any symptom domain 
at 2y, but significantly predict all three diagnostic domains later in childhood (Charman et al., 
2005) would be expected if inter-domain behavioral interactions increase with development.  At 
4-5y verbal rituals load on the same factor as repetitive use of objects and other manifestations of 
cognitive inflexibility (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009).  By 6-7y, a communication-related factor 
emerges encompassing stereotyped phrases, eye contact, and facial expressions. The 
hypothesized model would explain that whereas social deficits may be largely independent of 
cognitive inflexibility early in development, behavioral and cognitive interactions over time 
produce repetitive phrases - part linguistic inflexibility, part social communicative deficit. 
In another apparent contradiction, the loading of “age of first social smile” on a 
Stereotypic Behavior factor (Sacco et al., 2010) may seem to suggest early links between Social 
Interaction Deficits and Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests diagnostic domains, as 
in single-cause accounts of autism (e.g., Constantino et al., 2004).  In the context of the 
hypothesized alternative triad and developmental model, however, one might posit that “age of 
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first social smile” is an early example of behavioral interactions between Social-Communicative 
Deficits and stereotypy-related Cognitive Inflexibility factors.  In case cognitive flexibility may 
seem behaviorally unrelated to social smiling, consider the rapid cognitive control in play during 
a smiling response to a social overture, or during a decision to share an emotional response with 
a social partner at the same time as one is busy experiencing that response. 
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Table 8. Summary of ASC Trait Factor Analytic Studies Reviewed 
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4.3.1 Applying the Proposed Developmental Model: A Novel Account of Repetitious Behaviors 
In the proposed developmental model, primary, initially independent Social Interaction 
Deficits, Cognitive Inflexibility, and Sensory Abnormalities behaviorally interact and become 
related. Here we demonstrate the utility of this model by explaining the non-primary autistic trait 
of repetitive behaviors in terms of interactions between the latter two primary traits. To be clear, 
this is not meant to imply that these two primary traits interact more or less than any other 
pairing; to highlight this point, we follow our discussion of repetitive behaviors with a brief 
account of how communicative deficits would arise from interactions between Social Interaction 
Deficits and Cognitive Inflexibility.  
In the current diagnostic triad, repetitive behaviors are considered primary symptoms, and 
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are subsumed under the domain of Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests; sensory 
abnormalities, meanwhile, are treated as secondary symptoms. On face, repetitive behaviors are 
more easily categorized and accounted for using the diagnostic triad than the alternative triad, as 
such behaviors do not fit as clearly under any of the alternative triad domains.  Viewing the 
alternative triad through the lens of the proposed developmental model, however, such 
behavioral stereotypies can be explained as external, motoric manifestations of developmentally 
snowballing interactions between independent primary traits of Cognitive Inflexibility, and 
Sensory Abnormalities such as hypersensitivity to auditory, visual, or tactile stimuli.  This would 
explain why Chen et al. (2009) found that sensory hypersensitivities and cognitive inflexibility 
each predict the presence of repetitive behaviors, yet are unrelated to each other.  Repetitious 
movements may be externalized efforts to impart predictability on a world rendered chaotic and 
intractable by an abnormal, cognitively inflexible, perceptually overstimulated mental 
environment (Belmonte, 2008).  Relationships between ritualistic behaviors and perceived 
uncertainty or fearfulness exist likewise in young, typically developing children (Evans et al., 
1999). 
A crucial distinction, demonstrating the advantages of the present developmental 
interactionist account, is that as repetitive behaviors are continually used to compensate for 
cognitive-sensory interaction chaos, the more likely it becomes that neural networks hard-coding 
such interactions will arise.  Once encoded in dedicated neural networks, these behaviors could 
then take on a ‘life of their own’, arising under conditions that may not have triggered them prior 
to developmental snowballing.  Repetitive movements might arise in part as externalized efforts 
to impart predictability to a world rendered chaotic and intractable by an abnormal, cognitively 
inflexible and perceptually overstimulated mental environment (Belmonte, 2008).  Overall level 
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of functioning, then, may determine the executive control capacity available to inhibit 
externalizing, overtly motor behaviors.  Every individual would have some threshold beyond 
which cognitive-perceptual load could not be pushed without evoking externalizing behaviors.  
High-functioning people, with high thresholds, when confronted with sensory perceptual 
challenges would manifest mostly internalized responses that impose conceptual 'sameness,' 
whereas in low-functioning individuals this drive to render perceptual organization tractable 
might more often spill over into externalized, motor stereotypies that directly, mechanically 
impose sensory sameness. 
Multiple findings support this characterization of repetitive behaviors as emergent from 
an interaction of more primary sensory and cognitive symptoms, with overall level functioning 
determining the internal or external manifestation of such interactions.  Positive relationships 
between IQ and age, and restricted interests, have arisen in some cases, as well as negative 
relationships between IQ and age, and sensorimotor stereotypies (Szatmari et al., 2006; 
Papageorgiou et al., 2008). (IQ controlled for age, and age, within individuals, are taken here as 
correlates of overall functioning).  Likewise, factor analyses of retrospective (childhood) ADI-R 
items in one of the aforementioned longitudinal studies (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009) reveal an 
Anxiety and Compulsions factor; if internalized anxieties arise from cognitive inflexibilities 
faced with overstimulating novel situations, compulsive behaviors would be their external 
analogues.  The event-related timing of dorsolateral prefrontal cortical activation in a non-social 
visual attention task in boys with autism spectrum conditions correlates with ADI-R social and 
communicative subscores but not with the ADI-R repetitive behaviors subscore (Belmonte et al., 
2010), as might be expected if repetitive behaviors were an ætiologically secondary symptom. 
On the ADOS-G measure of current symptom presentation in the same participants, items 
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related to anxiety loaded negatively on the ADOS-G factor Hyperactivity, meaning that 
decreased hyperactivity was related to increased anxiety. Such a relationship would be expected 
if internalized manifestations of cognitive inflexibility and hypersensitivity to context novelty 
(e.g., anxiety in novel situations) increase as externalized manifestations (e.g., hyperactivity) 
decrease (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009).  The same investigation also found that full-scale IQ was at 
once unrelated to the Social Communication factor on both retrospective (childhood) ADI-R and 
current ADOS-G inventories, and significantly, negatively correlated with behavioral 
stereotypies at both time points. 
In this respect, some differences between ADI-R analyses may be complementary rather 
than contradictory. Where one analysis (Szatmari et al., 2008) found evidence for influence of 
higher cognitive functioning (as indicated by IQ and age) on ASC symptoms, in the form of a 
cognitively based need for sameness, others found evidence for the symptomatic manifestation 
of lower cognitive functioning in ASC, in the form of ritualistic behaviors (Lam et al., 2008; 
Kamp-Becker et al., 2009); one of the latter found this relationship both in early development 
and later presentation (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009).  When extracted factors from the Restricted 
and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests diagnostic domain were correlated with age, Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scale scores (VERBS), and ADI-R domain scores, Insistence on Sameness 
presentation (current and ever) was significantly, positively correlated with the ADI-R 
communication domain, and Repetitive Sensory and Motor Behaviors and Interests also were 
highly negatively correlated with adaptive functioning and IQ, measured via the VERBS and 
Loiter IQ, respectively.  The former result provides additional support for the proposed 
alternative triad in which communicative inflexibilities are grouped with the high-level repetitive 
behavior of circumscribed interests, as in Georgiades et al. (2007).  The latter provides more 
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concrete support for the idea that overall level of functioning (in this case indicated by IQ) may 
determine, or may correlate with, the threshold between internalized, cognitive drives, and low-
level repetitive behavior of externalized, stereotypic, motor drives. 
Of course, these are inferences about divergent developmental trajectories based on 
cross-sectional data; even the longitudinal analysis (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009) relied on 
retrospective ADI-R inventories for inferences about early developmental patterns.  There is 
some more direct developmental support for this hypothesis, though; a within-subjects, repeated 
measures, longitudinal analysis comparing high- and low IQ (median split) groups from age 4 
through age 19, with an intermediate data collection at age 13, using the ADI-R (with an added 
emotional responsiveness portion), ADOS, and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior scale (VABS), 
as well as the Stanford-Binet IQ test (McGovern & Sigman, 2005), found that both IQ groups 
significantly improved in Social Interaction Deficits and Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and 
Interests domains with age, but that the high IQ group improved significantly more than the low 
IQ group in Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors and Interests, and not in Social Interaction 
Deficits. Thus, across development higher functioning carries advantages specific to reducing 
repetitive behaviors. 
The novel account of repetitive behaviors offered here reconciles the multiple hypotheses 
of the origins and functioning of such behaviors offered by Turner (1999).  In imparting 
predictability on cognitive/perceptual chaos arising at the junction of weak central coherence-
related cognitive inflexibility, and sensory hypersensitivity, such behaviors serve as a 
homeostatic mechanism at the sensory perceptual level.  If the over-arousing stimulus is another 
person whose movements/touch/etc. cannot be predicted, these behaviors avoid reliance on the 
impaired metalizing that would otherwise render the other person’s actions predictable.  Once 
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such behaviors take on a life of their own in interactively specialized neural networks, they 
become operant behavior, present even in the absence of what originally brought them on.  Such 
neural networks would also make it more difficult to inhibit these behaviors, or to extinguish 
them via generation of novel behavior, both of which symptoms appear as aspects of executive 
functioning deficits. 
Meanwhile, inconsistencies in relating level of functioning to internalized and 
externalized manifestations of ‘sameness’ are reconciled by the notion that overall level of 
functioning establishes a maximum cognitive capacity for integrative processing and abstraction, 
determining whether sensory inputs are internalized or externalized.  As Turner notes, high-
functioning people with ASC can exhibit ‘low-level’ motoric repetition, and low-functioning 
people with ASC can exhibit an internalized insistence on sameness.  Such apparent 
inconsistencies can be accounted for by the present threshold model of overall functioning: 
sensory inputs hyper-arousing enough to surpass high functioning individuals’ greater threshold 
could produce externalized motoric compensation, whilst some inputs beneath even the lower 
threshold of low functioning individuals could produce an internalized compensatory need for 
sameness. 
The hypothesized relationship between cognitive inflexibilities and compensatory 
repetitive behaviors is well summarized in an interpretation of sibling correlations of ASC 
symptom severity (Spiker, Lotspeich, Dimiceli, Myers, & Risch, 2002): “while all the 
individuals with autism had some ritualistic or repetitive behaviors or preoccupations, with 
increasing cognitive ability these tend to be more symbolic and less motoric.”  Just as typical 
cognitive development elaborates iconic sensory and immediate motor capacities into symbolic 
concepts and sequential, goal-directed plans, atypical cognitive development elaborates a need 
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for sameness in these concrete domains into a need for scripting in domains that typically are 
more abstract.  Social psychology in typical individuals has demonstrated that the low “level of 
construal” of relatively immediate, unprocessed, unelaborated, detail-oriented, iconic perception 
evokes a similarly low “psychological distance” from one's own immediate perspective on 
objects, events, contexts, and social partners (Trope & Liberman, 2010), giving rise to a 
cognitive style that emphasizes peripersonal rather than distant spaces, current rather than past or 
future events, absolute rather than conditional plans, and egocentric rather than allocentric social 
perspectives – and vice versa, low psychological distance evokes low level of construal.   
Such effects arise during short-term, situational manipulations; analogous long-term, 
developmental influences might be expected to be even more potent.  As such, it is not difficult 
to conceive of how Cognitive Inflexibilities in higher-functioning ASC individuals might interact 
with, and developmentally adapt to, a basic Sensory Abnormality such as auditory 
hypersensitivity in such a way that narrow specialties such as musical savantism may emerge in 
the factor space between these two more primary, independently inherited traits.  Or, for a less 
exceptional example, the Communicative Deficits domain of the diagnostic triad may be better 
understood as deficits emerging developmentally from the factor space between primary Social 
Interaction Deficits and Cognitive Inflexibility domains of the alternative triad: whilst the former 
domain impedes development of the back-and-forth conversational reciprocity, the latter domain 
impedes the linguistic and conceptual fluidity and flexibility needed to adapt as conversations 
unfold and progress in unpredictable, unscripted ways. 
4.4 The Bigger Picture 
The advantage of a developmental perspective may seem obvious; behavioral theorists  
are well inured to the idea that developmental models are essential for teasing apart nature and 
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nurture. A previous review addressing the Kanner hypothesis, for instance, argues that the 
diagnostic triad is fractionable in terms of causal origins, with a concluding caveat that ASC 
traits do in any case interact developmentally (Happé & Ronald, 2008).  The developmental 
model posed here is more than an elaboration of such developmental caveats, though, offering an 
explanation for Kanner co-variance, but also how secondary, compensatory behaviors like 
repetitive behaviors can become stable aspects of autistic behavior, their expression dissociated 
from their original coping purpose. 
Specifically, the dynamic, developmentally snowballing interactionism posited here is 
best described within the model of “interactive specialization” (Johnson, Halit, Grice, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). A typical developmental perspective would take the view that 
independently heritable social-communicative deficits and cognitive inflexibilities both are 
programmed into neural architecture and begin to co-vary as they are expressed through shared 
behavioral and cognitive outlets.  An interactive specialization view, on the other hand, would 
hold that as these traits are integrated in co-expression repeatedly across development, their 
integration would come to be reflected in neural networks. These altered networks, in turn, 
become co-conspirators in this process, encouraging further integration by serving as a path of 
increasingly less neural resistance. 
If development occurred according to the former model, it would not be as clear why 
social and cognitive integration would become increasingly deeper to the extent that observations 
like Kanner’s depict restricted interests as a concomitant of social dysfunction. Within the 
interactive specialization view, however, it seems more likely that a bio-behavioral mechanism 
that produces social aversion may also induce an equal and opposite reaction of object 
preoccupation.  A child with ASC may spend early years being repeatedly bombarded with the 
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unsolicited advances of what appear to be large objects with irreproducible, inexplicable cause-
and-effect. Meanwhile, the more physically salient details of the inanimate world capture their 
attention: a spinning ceiling fan is a more visually salient motion than a moving mouth, a car 
horn a more intense sound than a voice. Physiologically, autism may begin with pathologically 
low-entropy local neural networks; these aberrant local representations then prevent the normal 
activity-dependent development of long-range, integrative connections (Belmonte et al., 2004ab) 
via a bio-behavioral feedback loop. As the child develops, they repeatedly retreat from the 
unpredictability of people to the predictability of the inanimate world, and their attention is 
captured by small parts of this inanimate world. As with all behavioral skills and strategies, 
practice makes perfect: repetition of these learnt coping behaviors can allow underused networks 
to atrophy, specializing the brain for a detail-over-context, iconic-over-symbolic, egocentric-
over-allocentric mode of perception and cognition.  
In this view, the hypothesized developmental model, and interactive specialization more 
generally, seem more equipped to explain autism as a developmental disorder, and to account for 
the Kanner-like co-variance observed to arise between initially independent traits over the course 
of development. This paradigm may aid behavioral scientists appealing for genetic links to 
behavioral outcomes, as well as cognitive neuroscientists interested in tying the proposed model 
to neural mechanisms 
4.4.1 Future Directions 
 Based on the present review, the most important theoretical shift to be made is to 
recognize that debates over single versus multiple causes of autism mean different things at the 
genetic, neurological and behavioral levels, and that a dynamic developmental lens is essential to 
understanding autism across these three levels of analysis.  If, for instance, a single genetic effect 
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leads to low entropy local networks, a single ‘cause’ could look multi-factorial from the outset at 
the neurological level, each disturbed inter-regional connection an additional neurological 
‘cause’, with the behavioral result being initially independent effects on social and non-social 
behavior. These behavioral effects would then interact developmentally according to the 
proposed model, leading to networks interactively specialized for the collection of behavioral 
traits we call autism, with social and non-social behaviors, and their neurological underpinnings, 
being somewhat connected, somewhat independent, and highly individualized. In a different 
scenario, if social and non-social ASC traits were to begin entirely independent at both genetic 
and neural levels, interactive specialization could result in their being seemingly related 
behaviorally and neurologically downstream. 
 The wide age ranges in the reviewed studies – varying as widely as 2-46y, frequently 
with maximum ages greater than 20y, and mean ages greater than 8y – present a problem of 
interpretation. For the present synthesis, inferences about developmental trajectories of 
social/non-social co-variance could be made only from three sources: the few longitudinal 
investigations that currently exist (e.g., Kamp-Becker et al., 2009); cross-sectional investigations 
repeating their analyses separately for younger and older sub-sections of the total sample (e.g., 
Szatmari et al., 2002); and meta-analytic comparisons of studies at early ages (e.g., Matson et al., 
2010) to other, less restricted samples.  It is only through the groundwork laid by such studies 
that the full importance of a developmental picture can be seen; with wide age ranges come large 
sample sizes (e.g., Frazier et al., 2008).  We also sympathies with the fact that every subject 
counts when it comes to such analyses. As such, rather than excluding older cases, we encourage 
investigators factor-analyzing ASC traits to include developmental elements.  Entering age as a 
co-variate in regression models, or segmenting samples cross-sectionally into age groups for 
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separate factor analyses are two straightforward ways to add a developmental element.  In the 
latter case, cross-sectional cuts between early ages would ideally be as thin as statistical power 
would allow, to capture as much early behavioral dynamism as possible. 
 A thorough test of the model proposed here would involve longitudinally tracking the 
developmental trajectory of relationships between ASC trait domains from infancy through late 
childhood. If the aforementioned account of repetitive behaviors is correct, then the fact that such 
behaviors frequently arise early in development implies that inter-trait interactions rapidly 
produce secondary traits. Particular emphasis would be placed on potential loci of inter-domain 
interaction (e.g., joint attention), and aspects of behavior hypothesized to be emergent 
manifestations of inter-trait interactions. In tracking repetitive behaviors, for instance, it would 
be important to note the contexts in which they initially arise (e.g., in response to loud noises), as 
well as when they began appearing in the absence of the initially associated context; the former 
would indicate the compensatory, primary trait associations of repetitive behaviors, and the latter 
when, developmentally, repetitive behaviors become an independently developing trait domain. 
 The ideal instrument for such a study would be a developmentally-minded behavioral 
inventory, as extensive as the ADI-R or ADOS-G but, unlike these inventories, allowing for re-
testing at different ages, to document changes in trait severity, and developmental emergence of 
secondary traits, including the contexts in which, for instance, repetitive behaviors arise (e.g., in 
response to loud noises). Constructing and validating inventories has been a major 
accomplishment for the field; what is needed now is the capability to apply these inventories to 
tracking age-related changes in autism. To date, the closest that studies have come to this 
approach are current-versus-ever comparisons of the ADI-R (Kamp-Becker et al., 2009); and a 
combination of multiple data collection points (2, 3, and 4 years old) using the MacArthur 
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Communicative Development inventory, and the CAST at age 8 (Ronald et al., 2006ab). 
However, the ‘ever’ component of the former is susceptible to hindsight biases and recall 
accuracy; and although the latter tracks early developmental changes in communication using 
multiple data points on the MacArthur, this inventory only measures communication traits, and 
transitioning to the CAST to inventory later childhood behaviors raises issues of inter-instrument 
consistency.  
If the ideal instrument were available, exploratory factor analyses, treating inventory 
items individually, could then be compared between data collection points. The proposed model 
would predict that between infancy and early childhood, factor analyses would indicate primary 
Sensory Abnormalities, Cognitive Inflexibility, and Social Interaction Deficits factors. These  
would interact, and by late childhood communicative deficits would arise and load on the latter 
two factors; and secondary repetitive behaviors would emerge and load on the former two 
factors. By adolescence, Kanner-like behavioral interactions between factors will become more 
neurologically stable, resulting in emergent Communicative Deficits and Repetitive Behaviors 
factors, reflecting behavioral presentation that is partly independent of primary factor associates. 
If such developmental comparisons were repeated for individuals from the bottom 85%, 85-95%, 
and top 5% of inventory scores, then the degree of Kanner co-variance should be more 
pronounced with increased trait extremity. Communicative Deficits and Repetitive Behaviors 
factors would arise earliest in the top 5% group, latest (if at all) in the bottom 85% group. 
 The most productive shift for diagnosis and treatment would be to institute a new core 
diagnostic triad of primary behavioral symptoms – Social Interaction Deficits, Cognitive 
Inflexibility, and Sensory Abnormalities – that better reflects the factor structures found in the 
literature.  The proposed DSM-V revisions to the diagnostic criteria for autism are a start.  For 
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instance, the proposed changes include moving reciprocation-related behaviors from the current 
Communicative Deficits factor into a broader social-communicative deficit category, and moving 
verbal inflexibilities into a broader restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests category. 
Further progress, then, can be made by recognizing the heterogeneity of behaviors categorized as 
restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests, separating cognitive inflexibilities and sensory 
dysfunction into distinct factors. The diagnostic definition of autism should also present 
symptoms in a hierarchical fashion, distinguishing between a primary triad of Social Interaction 
Deficits, Cognitive Inflexibility, and Sensory Abnormalities and secondary symptoms (e.g. 
repetitive behaviors). In this way, the presence of common secondary symptoms could be treated 
as an indication of co-morbid primary traits, but diagnosis would not depend on symptoms that 
manifest in highly individualized ways. 
 If Kanner co-variance does emerge through interactions between distinct social and non-
social traits, then non-social behaviors arising from Cognitive Inflexibilities might be exploited 
for social cognitive therapeutic ends – a “back door” route to training social cognition (Belmonte 
et al., 2010).  Boyd, Conroy, Mancil, Nakao, and Alter (2007) is a perfect demonstration of the 
behavioral mechanism through which Kanner-like co-variance arises, as well as the potential 
therapeutic benefits of exploiting this mechanism:  Peer-initiated play interactions are briefer 
when the toys in question lie outside the circumscribed interests of ASC children than when play 
is initiated with toys relevant to circumscribed interests.  When toys of interest are present, ASC 
children’s initial social bids to peers occur faster than when less preferred toys are present.  With 
the right context, attention to social interaction might be bootstrapped via attention to special 
interests. 
 
  107 
4.5 Conclusion 
Biologically and behaviorally emergent aspects of autistic traits and their sub- and non-
clinical manifestations can both be better understood as an independently or semi-independently 
inherited triad of primary factors Social Interaction Deficits, Cognitive Inflexibility, and Sensory 
Abnormalities dynamically interacting over time in cognition and behavior, giving rise to the 
quintessentially autistic inverse relationship between social and non-social skills first described 
by Kanner.  This dynamic model of autistic development provides theoretical insights into the 
nature and nurture of autism and, in so doing, informs more effective treatment, too.  Emergent 
symptoms, though diagnostically valid, would not be ætiologically primary (Yoder & Belmonte, 
2011), and early therapies addressing primary symptoms (Cognitive Inflexibility, Sensory 
Abnormalities) might be a more effective treatment for emergent symptoms than are therapies 
that attempt to confront behavioral diagnostic symptoms head-on.  For instance, early non-social 
cognitive exercises targeted at executive control and integration could exert knock-on effects on 
later social cognition (Belmonte et al., 2004ab).  This conjectured developmental mechanism 
would reinforce the case for the earliest possible intervention, and further would target such 
intervention at aetiologically primary rather than diagnostically determinative symptom domains.  
The aim of these early therapies would be to work with, rather than against, autistic brain 
physiology and autistic cognitive style (Chen et al., 2012), to channel development towards more 
integrative sensory and cognitive control. 
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